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Abstract 
This investigation explores how the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan utilise 
their abundant hydrocarbon resource endowments to spur economic development in the context 
of the global strive for natural resources. It takes departure in the observation that the prevailing 
assumption of the detrimental impact of natural resource dependence on economic development, 
also denoted as the so-called 'resource curse', is fundamentally challenged by the current 
Chinese and global demand for natural resources, which has changed the terms of trade of 
commodities vis-à-vis that of manufacturing goods. Based on an analysis of the geopolitical 
context, Soviet legacy, development strategies and economic development of Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan, respectively, the key finding of this report is that the possible negative outcomes of 
hydrocarbon dependence lies in the management of the resources and not in the resources per se. 
While both countries have been partly successful in utilising their resources to spur economic 
development, neither have steered clear of the pitfalls of the resource curse, though Kazakhstan 
on several key indicators has outperformed Turkmenistan in terms of economic development. 
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1. Problem Area 
The unprecedented high and still increasing Chinese demand for natural resources fundamentally 
challenges the prevailing understandings of the relationship between natural resources and 
economic development – notably the assumption of the negative impact of natural resources on 
economic development. This brings new hope for natural resource-wealthy countries which now 
have a historic opportunity to take advantage of this not only Chinese but global strive for natural 
resources to generate economic development. With its vast deposits of strategic natural resources 
and the pivotal location between the historical but fading power of Russia and the rising power of 
China, Central Asia is the geographical embodiment of the changing geopolitical reality. The 
question is, whether the Central Asian states manage to exploit these favourable conditions to 
utilise their abundant natural resources to spur economic development? 
The centrality of energy security in the global political economy is enhanced by key global 
trends unfolding in the 21
st
 Century – namely, the resource-driven growth of large developing 
states and economies (Singh & Bourgouin 2013: 1-5; Cooley 2012: 74; UNCTAD 2013: xv). 
Among these, the growth of China in particular has pervasive implications for the political 
economy of energy resources (Thun 2011: 361-362) and invites a reassessment of some of its 
fundamental dynamics. In particular the current high demand for energy resources such as 
hydrocarbons has proven surprisingly stable, even despite such shocks as the global financial 
crisis of 2008 (Singh & Bourgouin 2013: 1-3). In combination with the historic durability of the 
current resource boom a range of arguments for dismissing it as a mere part of the perpetual ebbs 
and flows of commodity prices in the global political economy has been thwarted (Singh & 
Bourgouin 2013: 1-5; Kaplinsky & Messner 2008). This strong albeit disputable stance draws 
heavily on the specific trends pertaining to China’s high demand for natural resources. Engaged 
worldwide in a ravenous search for natural resources to sustain and secure its immense growth, 
China's behaviour can be considered as challenging the fundamental assumptions about the 
economy of natural resources, including the terms of trade of commodities vis-à-vis 
manufacturing (Song 2013: 73; Gonzalez-Vicente 2011: 65-66). With its investments and growth 
China can thus arguably be seen as the main driver of a pervasive global strive for resources 
which in turn forms a key feature of the current global political economy (Kaplinsky & Messner 
2008; Gonzalez-Vicente 2011: 65-66).  
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A dominant position in the debate has in various ways shown and argued for the paradoxically 
detrimental impact of natural resources on economic development – a range of positions, which is 
often encapsulated as arguing for natural resource endowment as a curse rather than a boon 
(Gylfason 2004; Ross 1999: 297; Stiglitz 2005: 13; Tsalik 2003: 1; Karl 1999). Historical 
observations of the negative impact on economic growth and political and socio-economic 
development apparently corroborate this stance. It is, however, challenged by more recent 
literature suggesting that the resource curse is not inevitable. Rather, as one argument goes, 
manifestations of the curse in socio-economic development in resource-wealthy countries has 
more to do with the ways in which the natural resources are managed than the endowment of 
resources per se (Buur et al. 2013; Saad-Filho & Weeks 2013). As a consequence of the latter 
position, whether natural resources are a boon or a curse for the economic development of a 
given state is in fact a political question (Saad-Filho & Weeks 2013). In addition to this, with the 
above global trends of the expansion of the resource sector in the past decades along with the 
buoyant energy commodity prices the dominant negative verdict on the potential for resource-led 
development is arguably called into question. As such these trends, which will henceforth be 
referred to as the global strive for natural resources brings new hope for economic development 
of resource-wealthy states (Singh & Bourgouin 2013: 1-5).  
The global strive for natural resources and the renewed salience of geopolitics in the global 
political economy adds a strategic dimension to the importance of certain regions of the world in 
which these resources are located, thereby transforming them into theatres of contestation 
between different actors in demand hereof. In this context, the region of Central Asia makes up 
an interesting case. Understood in this report as the five former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, this region's geopolitical import owes as 
much to its material and geographical characteristics as it does to its geographical and political 
surroundings. The former concerns the undeniable wealth of natural resources to be found in the 
region. These include the vast hydrocarbon and mineral reserves located within the borders of the 
five states – some are in onshore deposits, while others are offshore in the Caspian Sea pertaining 
to the territories of the states (Laruelle & Peyrouse 2013: 165-190). Yet describing the region 
arguably also involves the broader geographical traits associated with its location and its 
surroundings. Whereas the Caspian Sea also makes Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan littoral states, 
the fact that the region as a whole is landlocked is notable. This feature translates into an 
 9 
 
inevitable dependence on relations to their neighbours compared to coastline states, owing to the 
geographic inhibitions related to accessing distant markets (Laruelle & Peyrouse 2013: 309). 
Therefore, the economic activity of countries and other actors in the vicinity of the region have an 
inherent and inextricable impact on the political and economic development of the countries of 
Central Asia. In addition to the great power of Russia located to its north, the region also borders 
with China, the important rising economic as well as political power to its east. While the former 
has had a clear impact in shaping the five former Soviet states, significant historical, cultural and 
economic ties strongly connects the region to China as well (Laruelle & Peyrouse 2013: 28). 
Moreover, considered from historic, cultural and religious perspectives, the region is furthermore 
tied to its other neighbours, including Iran and Turkey (Laruelle & Peyrouse 2013: xviii-xix). 
The region's wealth of natural resources plays a central role in the engagement of foreign 
actors. The notably geopolitical aspect of the global strive for resources is illustrated by the 
revival of talks of a ‘Great Game’ being played out in the region (Garrison & Abdurahmonov 
2011; Cooley 2012; Laruelle & Peyrouse 2013; Ahrens & Hoen 2013: 6). Originally a reference 
to the 19
th
 Century contest between the British and Russian empires for control over the region 
(Cooley 2012: 3; Ahrens & Hoen 2013: 6), this ongoing game is one of energy resources, the 
access to which in Central Asia attracts major players which besides China include both 
European and Asian firms and states in addition to historically invested Russia. An inherent 
feature of the political economy of natural resources, including the prospect for resource-led 
development, is that the Central Asian states have a curious lack of control over their natural 
resources. In fact achieving potential benefits from them relies on external actor involvement in 
various ways. These include acquiring the technology and investments necessary to extract them 
and infrastructure such as pipelines to transport them. The latter, furthermore, involves transit 
through other countries. Thereby a range of actors is inevitably involved in and thus has partial 
control over the energy resources of Central Asia (Fishelson 2007). Thus, “[f]or the Central 
Asian states, the major challenge is balancing external actors, and linking geopolitics and 
economic development” (Laruelle & Peyrouse 2013: xviii).  
The Central Asian states diverge greatly in terms of their wealth and type of resources. As for 
hydrocarbons, the countries of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan stand out with the overwhelming 
lead in oil and gas, respectively (Laruelle & Peyrouse 2013: 166-167). Simultaneously, the two 
countries and their respective economies appear highly dependent on these resources. This is seen 
 10 
 
in that they account for 60 and 90 per cent of exports for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, 
respectively (Atlas 2014A; Atlas 2014B)
1
. Moreover, the oil- and gas abundance of Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan makes up a vital element of the conditions under which these Central Asian 
countries seek to advance in terms of economic development. Since independence Kazakhstan's 
leaders have considered natural resources, especially oil, as the main driver of economic 
development (Abazov 2008: 41). Similarly, Turkmenistan's leadership expected economic 
growth to result from its vast deposits of natural gas (Abazov 2008: 44). Despite the similarities 
between the two countries, especially owing to the impact of the comparable Soviet legacy, their 
pursuits of resource-led development have varied greatly (Abazov 2008: 44). Comparing the two, 
Kazakhstan apparently stands out as the more successful in terms of its developmental 
endeavours. Seeking to position itself as the lynchpin of Central Asian cooperation, Kazakhstan's 
international behaviour appears in stark contrast to that of Turkmenistan whose neutrality has 
rather amounted to isolationism (Bohr 2004: 493; Tadjbakhsh 2012: 18).   
The present report seeks to examine the endeavours of the natural resource endowed countries 
of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to manoeuvre and benefit within the abovementioned current 
global strive for natural resources. The presence of natural resources in Central Asia inevitably 
plays a pivotal role in the socio-economic development of the five regional states, in particular 
for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan which may be considered resource- or commodity-dependent 
on oil and gas, respectively (UNCTAD 2013: xxvi). The prospects for benefitting from this 
endowment in turn depend on the ways in which it is utilised by the states' respective leaders. At 
the same time, however, the economic development of the landlocked region of Central Asia is 
inherently shaped by the economic activity of neighbouring as well as global actors. The question 
is thus whether, or to which extent, the investigated countries of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
are managing to grasp the abovementioned opportunity to embark on a sustainable growth path. 
Therefore the present report will investigate how the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan have utilised their natural resources as drivers of economic development in the 
context of the global strive for natural resources.  
 
                                                             
1 In addition, hydrocarbon revenues as per cent of GDP is approximately 40 per cent for Turkmenistan and 35 per cent for 
Kazakhstan (Bendini 2013: 5; ICG 2007: 20) 
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1.1 Problem Statement 
In the context of the global strive for natural resources, how do the Central Asian states of 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan utilise their hydrocarbon resources to spur economic 
development?  
 
1.2 Clarification of the Problem Statement 
Two central notions need clarification, namely, the global strive for natural resources and 
economic development, in that they both form crucial elements of the problem statement. The 
former has been described in the above Problem Area meanwhile economic development in this 
report is understood as a development, which benefits the population of a given country at large 
and is more than merely economic growth (Krueger & Myint 2014). It includes the idea of 
inclusive growth in which the economic opportunities of the population are increased and thus 
pertains to social and political perspectives in addition to the strictly economic (Ali & Son 2007). 
GDP per capita, HDI and general notions of living standards are among indicators, which will be 
included in order to analyse whether growth in GDP can be considered actual economic 
development rather than mere economic growth.  
The present investigation is a case study of the role of hydrocarbon resources in the economic 
developments of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The case study draws on selected notions from 
the resource curse theory and employs qualitative as well as quantitative data with a view to 
establishing how the two countries exploit their hydrocarbon endowments to drive their economic 
developments. In order to answer the Problem Statement, three research questions have been 
formulated;  
 
1. How can we understand the geopolitical contexts of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan? 
 
2. How do Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan seek to develop? 
 
3. To what extent have Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan escaped the resource curse? 
 
The analysis is thus divided into three parts which supplement and build upon each other. Each 
part will have a different analytical level with the first focusing on identifying and analysing the 
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geopolitical dynamics of Central Asia; the second serving as an outline of the development 
strategies of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which together with the theoretical concepts and the 
changing geopolitical dynamics will be applied in the third and final part of the analysis as tools 
to understand and scrutinise the empirical data measuring economic development in Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan.  
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2. Methodology 
This chapter will outline the methodological framework and –choices that shape the analysis of 
this report. It includes a presentation of the choice of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan as the cases 
of investigation, followed by the conceptualisation of the key concept of economic development, 
and an introduction of and reflections to the theoretical and empirical foundation of the 
investigation. In combination with the subsequent theoretical conceptualisations and 
considerations, this forms the foundation for a valid and comprehensive analysis. 
 
2.1 Analysis design  
In order to gain a thorough understanding of the geopolitical dynamics of Central Asia and in 
particular of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan the first analytical chapter seeks to answer;  
1) How can we understand the geopolitical contexts of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan? This will 
be assessed by first identifying the key geographic, demographic and historical features which 
have shaped the two countries. The latter point in particular will include considerations of their 
Soviet past. Second, it entails establishing the strategic as well as economic role of the 
infrastructure of hydrocarbon export, and establish the roles and impacts of the key actors of 
China and Russia on Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. 
In order to fully grasp the economic developments it is important to assess the core notions 
which drive the overall of development of the two states. Therefore the second analytical chapter 
examines their development strategies with a view to answering 2) How do Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan seek to develop? This chapter will establish the two respective strategies for 
development in a comparative analysis through which the strategies will be understood in relation 
to each other.  
The investigation then proceeds to a thorough investigation of the actual economic 
development of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, with a view to answering 3) To what extent have 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan escaped the resource curse? This question will be answered 
through an analysis of selected resource curse parameters of economic growth rate, Dutch disease 
tendencies, and diversification; rentier state tendencies of rents and income tax and corruption, 
and the socio-economic factors of education level, inequality and GDP per capita. In combination 
these three analytical chapters will answer the Problem Statement. 
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2.2 Research design  
This report centres on the two cases of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Throughout the analysis 
they will be juxtaposed in order to dissect the nuances in their respective economic and 
socioeconomic developments. The reason for choosing Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan is two-
fold: their numerous shared characteristics including primarily Soviet legacy, geographical 
location and cultural similarities, and our first-hand impression of two completely different 
development trajectories as illustrated by complete isolationism and absurd dictatorship in 
Turkmenistan opposed by international and regional engagement and significantly less 
omnipresent (albeit still authoritarian) regime in Kazakhstan. The basic notion of this reasoning is 
the methodological idea of it being analytically more durable to analyse the underlying 
mechanisms and dynamics behind the two immediate very different trajectories of two immediate 
very similar cases. In this sense our research design is best described as a heuristic and eclectic 
‘most similar case study’ understood as a design where: “(…) [c]ommon systemic characteristics 
are conceived of as “controlled for,” whereas intersystemic differences are viewed as 
explanatory variables” (Przeworksi & Teune 1970: 33). This report does not employ this 
analysis design as stringently as is suggested by Sidney Tarrow (2010) but merely as a reason and 
justification for choosing Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. This is perhaps best summed-up by 
Charles Tilly who observes that some cases are inherently interesting just because of the fact that 
they have taken different or even contrasting trajectories from similar points of departure (Tarrow 
2010: 234). Throughout the analysis both 'intersystemic differences' and 'common systemic 
characteristics' will be analysed when it serves the purpose of our investigation. 
The analytical findings of this investigation are valid first and foremost in the contexts of 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan as these are the cases of investigation. This owes to the unique 
historical legacy and specific including geographical characteristics of these countries, which is 
understood here as indisputably shaping the management of natural resources and their effects on 
the economic development within these countries. This understanding forms the basis of the first 
and second parts of the analysis which for that reason contain an elaborate assessment of how the 
specific characteristics of the two countries influence their room for manoeuvre within the 
Central Asian region. The overarching objective of investigating these two cases is to arrive at 
conclusions of relevance in a broader perspective of the global debate on natural resources and 
their impact on economic development. In addition to conducting an in-depth analysis of the 
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specific cases of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, this report thus also seeks to contribute to and 
further inform these ongoing discussions through the extrapolations that it enables
2
. 
 
2.3 Limitations  
The analytical purpose of this report gives a specific point of entry into the analysis of 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan's respective economic developments which fundamentally shapes 
the analytical choices made in the endeavour to answer the Problem Statement.  
First, the analytical focus on natural resource dependence is limited exclusively to 
hydrocarbons. Various other minerals such as uranium and natural resources found in 
Kazakhstan, for instance, will thus not be considered here. This owes to the analytical objective 
of examining the impact of natural resource dependence on economic development seeing as this 
generally characterises the countries considered in the resource curse debate. In the present 
investigation, a country is considered natural resource dependent when natural resources make up 
more than 60 per cent of its exports. In accordance with this criterion Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan qualify as resource-dependent due to their hydrocarbons, that is, oil for Kazakhstan 
and gas for Turkmenistan. While we are aware of the various other minerals such as uranium and 
natural resources found in Kazakhstan, as well as the significant production of cotton in 
Turkmenistan, these will not be considered in this investigation. 
Our focus on the role of hydrocarbons in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan's respective 
developments directly impacts which specific actors are included in this report. As noted in the 
Problem Area, geography and geographic proximity are considered pivotal in the endeavour of 
this investigation to understand the geopolitical contexts within which Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan must navigate. These notions also form guiding principles for which actors are 
deemed relevant for the investigation, notably China, Russia and Iran. These are included not 
only because they are neighbours to the countries investigated here, but also, and more 
importantly, because they are actively drawn into the hydrocarbon resource extraction 
development strategies of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Similar reasoning applies to the 
omission of for instance the United States of America (USA), the European Union (EU), India 
and Turkey in that neither meets the criterion of geographic proximity to our objects of 
investigation or active involvement in the hydrocarbon sector of Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan. 
                                                             
2 Chapter 8, Generalisability of investigation, elaborates further on this in a discussion 
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American oil company Chevron's engagement in the Kazakhstani Tengiz oil field, for instance, is 
dealt with merely as that of a foreign company in that given our focus on Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan's management of their natural resources Chevron's presence does not warrant the 
inclusion of USA as an actor in its own right. On a different note, we are aware of the clear 
limitation in the present report's rather simplistic presentation of states and firms as monolithic 
entities. We acknowledge this limitation which is a consequence of the objective of this 
investigation, which inherently values scope over detail. 
The increasingly relevant and ongoing climate debate is an inevitable aspect of the overall 
geopolitical and natural resource debate, however such considerations will not be included in this 
report. This owes to the premise on which this investigation is founded, namely the assumption 
that oil and gas are and will remain a strategic commodity in high demand in the foreseeable 
future. While debates about leaving the fossil fuels in the ground are highly relevant, this report 
deems the near future scenario of fossil fuels losing their high value as being highly unrealistic 
(Stevens 2003: 25). Even a less radical climate perspective on natural resources would acquire an 
entirely different approach and therefore change the scope of the report for which reason such 
discussions will not be considered further. Similarly, as a consequence of our purpose of 
investigation, the aspect of regime type and its possible correlation with the presence or absence 
of resource curse tendencies will only be included empirically in the investigation, i.e. not as a 
theoretical concept in its own right, and only to the extent that it serves to enable the overall 
analytical objective. This is despite our awareness of several authors deeming this relevant in 
analysing the relationship between authoritarianism and development and between 
authoritarianism and the resource curse (Haber & Menaldo, 2011; Kubicek, 1998).  
 
2.4 Theoretical and empirical foundation 
As mentioned the theoretical framework applied here is mainly founded in the resource curse 
literature. The area of resource curse theory is not easily demarcated nor does it have one sole 
source of origin. In the present report specific aspects of the resource curse theory have thus been 
selected with the purpose of addressing the particular dynamics unfolding within Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan. In outlining the resource curse theory we have mainly chosen to include 
contributions from Michael L. Ross, Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, Richard Pomfret, 
Svetlana Tsalik, Terry Lynn Karl, Thorvaldur Gylfason, Andrew Rosser and Frederick van der 
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Ploeg and Steven Poelhekke. These scholars provide different insights and arguments though all 
addressing the relationship between abundant natural resources and the economic development of 
countries. 
In addressing the resource curse literature, we also hold a critical view of the arguments in 
favour of this theory and its arguments and therefore also include considerations, which are more 
sceptical of the relationship between natural resources and economic development (Saad-Filho & 
John Weeks 2013). In this light, another objective of conducting the investigation of Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan's respective management of their natural resources is to contribute to and 
nuance the notions and reasoning at play in this large theoretical debate. It is to be emphasised 
that we adhere to the notion that whether countries suffer from resource curse or not, is strongly 
influenced by the way governments manage their resource abundance and that the abundance 
does not per se determine the “(…) social, political and institutional outcomes” in a given 
country (Saad-Filho & Weeks 2013: 5). The second analytical chapter is strongly premised on 
this understanding as it concentrates on how the governments of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
declaredly seek to develop and what role natural resources play in these development strategies. 
 
2.5 Reports, statistics and journal articles 
This report employs a wide range of different types of secondary empirical data including reports 
and statistics from among others the United Nations (UN), European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD), World Bank (WB), World Trade Organisation (WTO), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), International Crisis Group, Asian Development Bank, journal articles and 
official government material
3
 from both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. It has been pursued to 
use only reliable data available, as data and information from both Kazakhstan and especially 
Turkmenistan are difficult to obtain and are often misleading or unsupported. Censorship and the 
fact that most data and material from the two countries is not in English form a clear challenge 
for conducting this investigation. We have therefore sought to include official government 
sources for their development strategies in order to ensure validity. The official documents from 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have solely been used in the second part of the analysis where the 
actual strategies of the two countries are analysed. When including disputable data it will be 
indicated in the analysis.  
                                                             
3 These are only used in the second part of the analysis to illustrate the development strategies of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. 
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The UN, EBRD, World Bank, WTO, IMF, International Crisis Group and Asian have 
primarily been included to emphasise the economic conditions in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. 
These data have been used in order to clarify how the abundance of natural resources have 
affected the key performance figures in both countries. In describing the economic development 
of the countries especially the standardised measures of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), GDP 
per capita and Human Development Index (HDI) have been included to compare the two 
countries' developments. In this report two of the key variables are growth in GDP and GDP per 
capita. It is important in this connection to underline that these indicators are used in awareness 
of the uncertainties and difficulties they may entail. Evidence suggests that GDP figures are often 
uncertain and mere estimations due to lack of reliable data (Guyer 2014). What is further 
problematic is the recent studies on how the specific measurement of GDP deliberately has been 
used to promote and implement certain development policies and strategies and influence aid 
flows in a desirable direction. GDP is used by the World Bank to categorise countries as e.g. 
Middle-income or Poor, which is relevant when IMF and World Bank programmes are being 
negotiated (Jerven 2012). This knowledge of the potential politicisation of key economic figures 
are incorporated into the present report and GPD e.g. through a careful usage of these figures. 
In terms of books and journal article contributions, numerous different scholars have been 
included to validate and nuance the answering of the problem statement. Especially professor of 
Economics Richard Pomfret and Marlene Laruelle & Sebastian Peyrouse must be pointed out as 
contributing heavily to the deductions made in the present report. Pomfret have published 
numerous articles and books, and must be perceived as a significant scholar within the field of 
Central Asian development. Likewise, the publication by Laurelle & Peyrouse, “Globalizing 
Central Asia: Geopolitics and the Challenges of Economic Development” (2013), has contributed 
significantly to the understanding of the geopolitical context of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in 
this report. While their contributions are crucial in understanding the dynamics of the region, we 
are well aware that their specific involvement inherently shapes the analysis in a specific 
direction. This implicit subject to bias through the reliance on these authors is arguably a 
limitation to our findings, yet they have been included due to their provision of valuable insight 
into our objects of interest. Our reliance on these authors and other secondary sources also relates 
to the abovementioned linguistic challenge in gaining access to information and data about the 
two countries. Through a stringent and critical employment of the available data and concurrent 
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considerations of the reliability of the included material and sources we have striven to maximise 
the validity and reliability of our investigation. These considerations are made explicit throughout 
the investigation so as to ensure transparency for the reader.  
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3. Theoretical perspectives on natural resources and development 
This chapter will briefly introduce the hydrocarbon extraction sector before diving into the 
resource curse literature. The latter is then presented through a more thorough outline of the 
concrete take of this present report on the vast academic field of the resource curse. Finally it 
conceptualises the central trends associated with the resource curse, which we have selected to 
employ in the subsequent investigation.  
 
3.1 The hydrocarbon extraction sector  
This section aims to present the general actors and mechanisms that constitute the resource 
extraction sector on a global level. This short introduction serves to frame the forthcoming 
theoretical review of the resource curse literature and aims to provide an insight into the 
hydrocarbon extraction sector.  
Both oil and gas are finite resources and considered in isolation, these resources will be in 
short supply if demand maintains current level. Estimations suggest oil and gas shortage within 
only 40 years, which automatically will increase their strategic value (Geologi N.A.; Campbell & 
Laherr re 1998: 83). Oil and gas are by far the most wanted natural resources4 and constituted 
56,3 per cent of global energy consumption in 2013 (IEA 2013: 28). It is, however, difficult to 
determine the actual amount of reserves left on a global level, as undiscovered deposits might 
exist as earlier experience indicates. Additionally, new types of technology have rendered it 
possible to locate and reach former infeasible and uneconomic reserves (Ahmed 2013; Laruelle & 
Peyrouse 2013: 165). Especially USA and China have become increasingly dependent on oil and 
gas as a means to sustain their levels of growth (Swami 2011; EIA 2014). This constitutes the 
global energy game as also mentioned in the problem area in which states struggle to secure a 
sufficient share of the inherently limited supply of energy resources. For Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan, this rising demand for resources translates into a potentially auspicious position in 
this global strive. 
In order to provide an understanding of the hydrocarbon extraction sector it is crucial to locate 
the different actors that are typically involved in this industry. In general, states in which  
extraction takes place play a key role but, as will be evident in this report, the role of states varies 
substantially from having the monopoly over resources to partnering equally alongside 
                                                             
4 This does of course not include agricultural products  
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multinational companies. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are here examples of two very different 
models of state and multinational company engagement.  
Another key difference between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan is the different types of 
hydrocarbons they possess. Turkmenistan’s hydrocarbon extractive sector is mainly centred on 
natural gas where Kazakhstan’s is mainly based in oil (EIA 2012: 4; EIA 2013B). This is relevant 
due to the idiosyncratic characters of both oil and gas. 
The extraction (when onshore) and especially subsequent transportation of oil are relatively 
simple and unsophisticated processes, which, due to the irrelevance of the geographical location 
of extraction, manifests itself in a single world price on oil (ICG 2007: 2). In this way it is not 
about supply from one particular location but on oil no matter where the extraction takes place, 
reaching the global market (ICG 2007: 2). 
In terms of natural gas both the extraction but especially the transportation are more 
complicated. The difficulties of transporting a gas compared to liquid make pipeline networks 
without comparison the most effective and most common way of transportation (ICG 2007: 2). 
Unlike oil, constrains on transportation has effectively resulted in no single: “(…) world price for 
gas” (Pomfret 2013: 64). Gas contracts and therefore prices are most often long-term and are 
linked up on: “(…) quantity commitments along a given pipeline” (Pomfret 2013: 64), which is 
opposite the single world market for oil (ICG 2007: 2). This logically limits the gas export 
opportunities for countries and companies, which in turn underlines the geopolitical significance 
of especially gas pipelines. Oil is relatively easy to transport by ship, which in most cases is not a 
viable option for gas exporters. Illustratively, if gas is to be transported by ship it requires a 
cooling to 162 degrees Celsius in order to transform it from gas to liquid (ICG 2007: 2, 3). In the 
case of Turkmenistan its landlocked geopolitical reality puts a logical restrain on this option, 
which will be further analysed in chapter 4. 
 
3.2 The role of resources in development 
The resource curse theory is a multifaceted area of investigation and has been subject of 
discussion for several decades (Pomfret 2011: 147; Tsalik 2003: 1; Karl 2005: 23). This chapter 
briefly touches upon the preliminary debates resulting in the emergence of the resource curse 
theory.  
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As mentioned earlier, the overall argument of the resource curse theory is that countries 
endowed with abundant resources appear to display worse political, economic and socioeconomic 
outcomes compared to their counterparts without them (Ross 1999: 297; Stiglitz 2005: 13; Tsalik 
2003: 1; Buur et al. 2013: 14; Singh & Bourgouin 2013: 2). This observation strongly contradicts 
earlier predictions in which the possession of natural resources was widely regarded as a possible 
entry to economic growth and prosperity for developing countries (Ross 1999: 301; Gylfason 
2007: 2; Karl 2005: 21; Stiglitz 2003: xi). This understanding found further support during the oil 
booms of the 1970s and bright expectations for developing countries with abundant resources 
were during this period at their highest (Karl 1999: 31, 32; Ross 2001: 5). The very same 
expectations dominated initially after the dissolution of the Soviet Union where former Soviet 
states were deemed a prosperous future due to the vast amount of resources situated especially 
within the different Central Asian countries (Pomfret 2011: 146). It was thus expected that the 
resource deposits would enable an improvement and development of the broader aspects of these 
countries' macroeconomic situations through the massive revenues characterising oil and gas 
export (Ross 1999: 301). These positive extrapolations were mainly anchored in the belief that 
developing countries experienced an imbalance in production factors illustrated by a surplus of 
labour concurrent with a shortage of investment capital (Ross 1999: 301; Ross 2001: 6). The 
abundance of highly valuable resources thus appeared as an evident solution or way to mitigate 
some of the problems experienced by developing countries. 
However, since the 1980s scholars have generally challenged this idea of resources 
automatically being favourable for countries in possession hereof (Rosser 2007: 38; Singh & 
Bourgouin 2013: 29). The present literature suggests a gloomier picture of natural resources and 
their influence on economic and societal development. Naturally it is recognised that several 
countries (e.g. Norway, Australia, Botswana) have successfully extracted natural resources 
without succumbing to the resource curse (Gylfason 2004: 1; Fofack 2009). It is thus emphasised 
that the possession of resources does not per se evolve into negative trajectories although the 
general tendency illustrates a negative impact of natural resources on development (Karl 2005: 
22, 23; Gylfason 2004: 26). Ross (1999: 307) addresses the responsibility of states in the 
statement:  
  The failure of states to take measures that could change resource abundance from  
  a liability to an asset has become the most puzzling part of the resource curse.  
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In continuation of this, the relevant question is what underlying mechanisms are at play in the 
resource curse literature. 
 
3.3 Theoretical demarcation 
As indicated above the resource curse theory is an area covering numerous aspects of how and to 
what degree natural resources negatively influence a given country both in terms of economic, 
political and socioeconomic parameters. It is important to underline that the resource curse theory 
is not one single coherent theory coined by one author and presented in full at once. On the 
contrary, the resource curse is a theoretical concept, which has developed over time and 
continues to do so with contributions from various scholars from different disciplines (Buur et al. 
2013). This has implications for the present report in the sense that we will refer to this 
theoretical conceptualisation as resource curse literature and not as a distinct resource curse 
theory. This is furthermore in accordance with our theoretical demarcation; to use a Bruno Latour 
expression the resource curse theory is a black box in which various different perspectives and 
ideas can be and have been contained (Fuglsang 2009: 432). The consequence is that a clear 
positioning within the resource curse literature is of utmost importance to this investigation. The 
theoretical position in the present report is aligned with those scholars, who reject a causal 
understanding of the resource curse. Instead, our stance is that the curse must be seen as the 
outcome of various factors such as historical legacy, institutional setting and political 
management in order to understand how hydrocarbons can turn out to be more of a burden than a 
valuable asset for economic development of resource abundant countries. In this present report 
we are therefore looking for correlations and not causalities.  
The following section will outline the arguments behind the recourse curse literature as we 
intend to utilise it. A thorough use of the theoretical concepts will be applied primarily in the 
third part of the analysis (chapter 6).  
 
3.3.1 Economic Growth and Dutch Disease 
One of the most prominent arguments from the resource curse literature revolves around the 
aspect of economic growth within resource rich countries (Gylfason 2004; Sachs & Warner 1995; 
Tsalik 2003: 3).  
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Thorvaldur Gylfason’s study from 2004 investigates the relationship between natural resource 
export dependent countries and economic growth. Gylfason, as numerous other scholars, 
identifies that resource dependent countries tend to display lower levels of growth compared to 
countries without these resources, due to different self-perpetuating mechanisms (Gylfason 2004: 
1; Sachs & Warner 1995; Sachs & Warner 2001; Tsalik 2003: 3). Generally the argument is that 
countries, which are excessively dependent on the export of a few natural resources, tend to 
crowd out other sectors or industries thereby impeding the total economic growth in society 
(Gylfason 2004: 1, 2). An expression of this development is what has been labelled the ‘Dutch 
disease’ inspired by the discovery of gas reserves in the Netherlands in the end of the 1950s and 
early 1960s (Karl 1999: 43; Gylfason 2004: 2; Tsalik 2003: 5). The Dutch disease denotes the 
situation when a country experiences radical growth in natural resource profits resulting in an 
increase in the rate of exchange, which directly affects other export sectors negatively as they 
become less competitive on the world market (Karl 1999: 43; Gylfason 2004; Saad-Filho & 
Weeks 2013: 9; Pomfret 2010). For instance other ‘healthy’ processing or manufacturing sectors 
become uncompetitive due to the appreciation of the currency of a given country. More 
concretely, Dutch disease occurs; 
 
  [W]hen the foreign exchange earnings from the export of a country’s natural  
  resources are converted into local currency, raising the value of that country’s  
  currency. As a result, its tradable goods become more expensive and hence less  
  competitive both domestically and as exports. With declining sales, the labour- 
  intensive manufacturing and agricultural sectors decline, creating unemployment  
  and increasing dependence on natural resources. (Tsalik 2003: 5, 6)  
 
This quote by Svetlana Tsalik illustrates how the actual dependence on natural resources and the 
subsequent rise in exchange rates pose potential devastating consequences for other export 
dependent sectors of the economy. This could thus potentially squeeze out sectors also being 
productive of growth. According to Gylfason (2004), this in itself can produce various negative 
impacts on the level of growth primarily by reducing the total exports of a country.  
Concurrently this lack of economic diversification and dependence on natural resources makes 
countries highly exposed to booms and busts as world prices on resources such as oil and gas 
fluctuate substantially (Gylfason 2004: 2; Pomfret 2013: 69). Being dependent on one sector or 
industry makes it highly difficult for countries to reasonably plan future budgets as the economy 
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is influenced by this sector's potential prosperity or downturn (Karl 1999: 43; Karl 2005: 23; 
Tsalik 2003: 5, 6). It is thus argued that the sector concentration and crowding out effect might 
enhance governments incentives to adopt protectionist policies in order to maintain 
uncompetitive industries, which make these sectors dependent on the oil sector to survive (Karl 
2005: 23, 24). This tendency might further reduce the incentives to innovate or develop within 
these sectors receiving support from the oil or gas sector, which further obstructs the possibility 
of being competitive on the world market (Karl 2005: 23, 24).  
Besides, as emphasised by the literature, the specific characteristics of the dominant sector 
have much influence on the specific development of a given country. Oil and partly gas sectors 
are normally perceived to be non-labour intensive, characterised by low levels of knowledge 
sharing and skills and technologically intensive (Karl 2005: 24; Ross 2001: 5). The sector is often 
concentrated on the extraction of resources within the developing countries while external actors 
possibly situated in other countries undertake the subsequent processing. This might reduce the 
benefits of oil and gas within the developing country, as only few people are employed in the 
industry. This is especially evident if more labour-intensive export sectors such as farming or the 
like are crowded out by the oil or gas sector (Karl 2005).  
In sum, the concentration of the oil and gas sector as the dominant export share of a country 
might result in some inexpedient outcomes, in the above primarily regarding lower levels of 
growth, the crowding out of alternative export sectors, increasing vulnerability and difficulty of 
budget planning and possible protectionist policies. In the two subsequent sections, institutional 
and socioeconomic consequences of the resource dependence will be outlined.     
 
3.3.2 Public institutions 
This section of the theory focuses on natural resources and how they affect the public institutions 
of a country in possession hereof.  
According to Joseph Stiglitz (2003: xi), the most pressing issues facing resource wealthy 
countries are not necessarily of economic character but more a matter of politics. As mentioned 
above gas and oil revenues comprise immense sums and accordingly affect both public spending 
and how public institutions behave as revenues from natural resource extraction often go directly 
into state and government budgets (Ross 2001: 5; Karl 1999: 35). Being dependent on especially 
 26 
 
oil is highly coupled with frail public institutions having difficulties of managing the utilisation 
of abundant natural resources (Karl 2005: 25).  
The term ‘rentier states’ has often been used to describe the mechanisms permeating state 
behaviour in countries with abundant resources (Alkhater 2012; Bjorvatn & Naghavi 2011). The 
term rentier state implies that a given state survives based on natural resource export earnings 
(rents) instead of relying on e.g. tax revenue obtained from the population (Barma et al. 2012: 
48). When a state budget is financed through unearned revenues and not through non-resource 
taxation, which would require relatively more of an effort from state institutions to manage, this 
often leads to weak institutions (Karl 1999: 36; Barma et al. 2012: 48). This can be seen in a 
tendency for institutional rigidity and high barriers to reform in resource abundant countries (Karl 
1999: 36; Barma et al. 2012: 48). 
What further characterises a rentier state is the negative relation between the populace and the 
ruling body of the state, as taxation arguably constitutes an important and direct relationship 
between the state and the population. This deduction is founded in the idea that:  
 
  It gives the government the means to extract resources from the public and, in  
  return, the public gains the right to demand government expenditure   
  accountability (Tsalik 2003: 6).  
 
 Exactly government accountability in terms of public spending is interesting in relation to rents 
from resource extraction. This is relevant both when talking about prestige construction projects 
also referred to as ‘White Elephant’ projects and when it comes to military spending (Ploeg & 
Poelhekkey 2009: 736; Gylfason 2001: 5). In terms of the former, prestige projects are often not 
economically viable and will have a negative influence on the overall economy (Ploeg & 
Poelhekkey 2009: 736). In relation to the latter, vast natural resource deposits might tempt 
neighbouring countries to interfere or even invade, which often leads resource-rich states to use a 
significant share of the natural resource rents on national defence (Gylfason 2001: 5). This 
spending is said to have a direct negative effect on economic growth as it has a negative effect on 
resource allocation and capital formation (Gylfason 2001: 5). 
Not only do oil and gas revenues increase public spending and also irresponsible public 
spending, windfall rents further develop incentives for borrowing in order to satisfy budget 
planning (Ploeg & Poelhekkey 2009: 736; Karl 1999: 36, 39; Tsalik 2003: 6). The price 
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fluctuations on gas and oil once again highlight the vulnerable position of countries dependent on 
natural resource revenues which is further underlined by the circumstance that several of the most 
resource dependent countries feature among the most heavily indebted countries in the world 
(Tsalik 2003: 5). This is because, as several cases have shown, the revenues from resources are 
used as collateral for: “(…)‘excessive’ borrowing at the expense of future generations, which can 
harm the economy in both the short and the long run” (Ploeg & Poelhekke 2009: 736). 
The immense revenues on oil and gas extraction have similarly been connected to increasing 
levels of corruption (Tsalik 2003: 4; Karl 2005: 25; Leite & Weidmann 1999). Dependence on 
natural resources statistically increases the possibilities of corruption or ‘rent seeking’ behaviour, 
which is negatively associated with economic growth (Gylfason 2001: 5, 6). Terry Lynn Karl 
(2005: 26) emphasises this mechanism by stating that:  
 
High levels of corruption contribute to the resource curse by deforming policy 
choices; for example, policymakers in oil-exporting countries tend to favour mega-
projects in which payoffs can be more easily hidden and the collection of bribes 
facilitated, while eschewing productive long-term investments that are more 
transparent. This, in turn, lowers both growth and income levels.  
 
3.3.3 Socioeconomic consequences of natural resources abundance 
This section will include socioeconomic aspects of resource abundance and how the resource 
curse theory view these correlations.  
Being highly dependent on resources has been positively related to the level of inequality and 
poverty within countries (Ross 2001; Tsalik 2003: 4). The link here is rent seeking. If rent 
seeking is paramount it is likely to divert income distribution, which will lead to an increase in 
inequality (Gylfason 2004: 9). Through a regression Gylfason (2004: 12, 13, 14) shows that a rise 
in inequality will lead to a decrease in growth. This relationship between inequality and growth is 
a disputed topic but here the underlying argument is that the force of inequality reducing social 
cohesion and creating conflict is greater than the force of equality creating a weakened incentive 
to work and educate oneself. In continuation of inequality the resource curse theory underlines 
the potential negative effect price fluctuations on global energy markets will have on poverty 
levels of resource abundant countries (Pomfret 2010: 871). According to the theory price 
fluctuation is a prerequisite of resource-led development and when these price drops occur it will 
result in slow growth, lack of poverty alleviation and in direct and indirect negative consequence 
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for the weakest groups in society (Pomfret 2010: 871; Stevens 2003: 9). Ross (1999) further 
illustrates the positive correlation between natural resource abundance and income inequality, 
low levels of education, poor healthcare and high rates of child mortality. 
When it comes to education Gylfason (2001) also suggests that natural resources and the level 
of human capital are inversely related. The greater the role natural resources have in a given state 
budget the relatively more significant the negative influence on the country’s educational level 
will be (Gylfason 2001: 7, 8). In absolute terms, a resource abundant country will according to 
Gylfason lack human capital, which will come to show in poor educational performance. The 
dynamics behind is that due to vast inflow of cash the incentives for long-term investments in 
education both on a national level but also on individual level will decrease (Zoega et al. 1999). 
As indicated in the above, natural resource wealth does shape public institutions. It is further 
argued by Karl (1999: 34) that novel states or transition states are particularly vulnerable to the 
mechanisms of the resource curse, which often evolve into ‘malfunctioning’ institutions from the 
onset. Tsalik (2003: 5) further highlights this in her quote:  
 
  The countries most vulnerable to the resource curse are those that have not yet  
  developed democratic institutions and a competent public administration system  
  and civil service. 
 
This assertion makes it highly relevant to look into how the oil and gas reserves of Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan, respectively, have influenced the transition from Soviet rule to independence 
up until today. We therefore wish to scrutinise the above arguments of the consequences of 
natural resources on public institutions and public spending, the level of inequality, poverty and 
corruption within Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.   
 
3.3.4 Summary 
The purpose of the above is to map how natural resource reserves such as oil and gas may 
influence the economic development and surrounding society. Based on this the following 
analysis aims to assess how or whether these indicators in fact appear in the contexts of 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Our stance in this debate and consequent approach to the analysis 
is in alignment with those scholars who argue that the endowment of abundant natural resources 
in itself does not automatically translate into negative economic development. While historical 
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and empirical evidence points to this relation, importantly we do not consider these outcomes as 
inevitable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 30 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 2 
 
Analysis  
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4. Geopolitical dynamics in Central Asia  
In this first part of the analysis the overall purpose is to unravel the geopolitical context of 
Central Asia, thereby introducing the region as well as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. This forms 
the foundation on which the following two parts of the analysis can be built. This historical 
analysis of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan will serve as the first step in understanding the 
geopolitical context within which Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are seeking to develop. The 
focus will be on analysing the similarities and differences between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
in terms of geography and demography, and characteristics and current impact of their Soviet 
legacies. Next, pipelines are assessed as a geopolitical tool since, as will be argued, they form an 
undeniable part of the equation of hydrocarbon-based development in the present cases. Finally, 
the changing roles of both Russia and especially China in Central Asia will be assessed, focusing 
on how these affect the geopolitical dynamics of the region and dynamics of the global political 
economy.  
In relation to the problem statement, this part of the analysis thus forms the foundation for 
understanding the ‘context of the global strive for natural resources’. It contributes to the answer 
of how Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have utilised their natural resources to spur economic 
development in that ‘the global strive for natural resources’ is understood to constitute the very 
frame of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan’s development.4 
 
4.1 Geographic characteristics of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan  
The five Central Asian
5
 states of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan constitute a distinct geopolitical region with a particular historical and cultural legacy 
and political, economic and geographic dynamics (Abazov 2008: 1). Central Asia has for almost 
two thousand years been a crossroad for trade between Europe, The Middle East and East Asia. 
The geopolitical significance of Central Asia also owes to the fact that it is: “(…) a meeting point 
of three major world religions an civilizations- Buddhism, Islam and Christianity” (Abazov 
2008: 1).  
Kazakhstan has a population of 16.207.000 (UN 2014A), which gives a population density of 
only six persons per square kilometre. Along with the inflow of legal and illegal Kyrgyz and 
                                                             
5 Central Asia is a somewhat disputed and ambiguous appellation but this will not be analysed in any detail in this report 
(Cumming 2012: 11; Roy 2000: 1) 
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Uzbek migrants – estimated to 3,33 per 1000 population in 2006 – the significant urbanisation of 
recent years can be explained as connected to Kazakhstan's economic growth (LC 2006: 4). With 
5.105.000 people in Turkmenistan has a population of roughly one-third of that of Kazakhstan 
and a population density of 10,5 people per square kilometre (UN 2014B). Additionally its 
population is very young with 35,2 per cent being under 14 years old in 2006 (LC. 2007: 4).  
In a geographical perspective Kazakhstan is in many ways a noteworthy and unusual country. 
With a territory of 2.717.000 square kilometres Kazakhstan is by far the largest of the Central 
Asian states and the ninth largest country in the world (Abazov 2008: 41; LC 2006: 3). 
Kazakhstan is a littoral state to the landlocked Caspian Sea and is without any maritime coastline 
the world’s largest landlocked country making it heavily reliant on its neighbouring states in 
terms of transportation (Laruelle & Peyrouse 2013: 242). The implications of this landlocked 
geopolitical reality will be further illustrated below in analysing Kazakhstan’s hydrocarbon 
extraction sector and the attendant necessary pipeline infrastructure.  
 
(ICG 2007: 38) 
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Another geographical characteristic, which defines Kazakhstan historically, culturally as well as 
geopolitically, is its neighbours. Kazakhstan is situated in a significantly different geopolitical 
reality than the rest of the Central Asian states, primarily regarding its 6.846 kilometre long 
border to Russia (Ipek 2008: 1180). This proximity to Russia, including a practically 
undefendable border of this length suggests a notable impact of Russia on Kazakhstan's political 
room for manoeuvre (LC 2006: 3; Ipek 2008: 1181). This understanding is arguably corroborated 
by the fact that unlike many other former Soviet Union states Kazakhstan did not increase its 
military spending in the post independence years which suggests that Russia would not allow for 
Kazakhstan to become a regional military power (Fas N.A.: 4; Ipek 2008: 1181).  
But Russia is not the only relevant neighbour of Kazakhstan. With the re-emergence of China 
as a significant actor on the world stage its role in and impact on Central Asia has become 
evident. With a 1.533 kilometres long border shared with Kazakhstan and also, though shorter 
than that of Kazakhstan, long stretches of borders with both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan China 
already has impacted the geopolitical dynamics of Central Asia  (LC 2006: 3). As stated in the 
Problem Area, China’s high and apparently increasing demand for all kinds of commodities is 
potentially a game changer in the respective development strategies of Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan. The significance of the proximity of both China and Russia will be elaborated 
further below (section 4.4). 
For Turkmenistan, some of the above characteristics evidently apply as well. Turkmenistan 
has a territory of 488.100 square kilometres and is like Kazakhstan a littoral state to the Caspian 
Sea but otherwise landlocked (LC 2007: 3). Unlike Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan neither borders 
Russia nor China. Though Turkmenistan is arguably still influenced by the two great powers, its 
geographic location makes it relevant to consider another important neighbour, namely Iran. Iran 
shows great potential of becoming a significant trading partner - notably, Turkmenistan and Iran 
are already engaging in a so-called oil swap agreement (Roy 2000). However, Turkmenistan's 
commitment to this agreement is primarily to be understood from the perspective of strategic and 
foreign policy interests: As will also be recalled from the Problem Area, these are centred 
strongly on isolationism, part of which arguably entails enhancing independence from Russia 
(Pomfret 2013: 69). However, Iran's strategic significance as potential partner to Turkmenistan is 
irrefutable. With its status as a pariah state Turkmenistan's relations to Iran have been less 
isolationist but they do, nonetheless, remain merely cordial (Peyrouse 2012: x). Thus, as is the 
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case of its general foreign policy and international status of “permanent (or positive) neutrality”, 
Turkmenistan's Iran policy can be explained as originating in former President Turkmenbashi’s6 
“pathological fear of foreign influence” (Peyrouse 2012: x, xii). This objective of minimising 
reliance on specific foreign actors to prevent subordination prevails not only in Turkmenistan but 
also in Kazakhstan (Tadjbaksh 2012: 18, 20). Notably, Kazakhstan's idea of independence, by 
contrast, goes through a policy of pervasive liberalisation and privatisation (Laruelle & Peyourse 
2013: 224; Abazov 2008: 41; Tsalik 2003: 136). 
 
4.2 Soviet Legacy 
In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union several new states emerged. In both 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan independent statehood did not predate the Soviet Union. Logically 
this resulted in a somewhat nervous beginning for the two new states, as they were faced with the 
challenge of (re-)constructing their respective national identity, history, and state institutions 
(Mygind 1999: 26; Roy 2000: 2, 165; Luong 2004: 3, 11). As will be recalled, in the 
understanding of the present report this process is inherent to investigating their potential for 
economic development in this report.  
Stalin’s establishment of the Central Asian states in the 1920s and the subsequent 
consolidation of Soviet rule meant that with its disintegration Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan did 
not part with a political and military alliance between sovereign states – rather they parted with a 
Union that constituted an ubiquitous political, economic, military and cultural power centrally 
controlled from Moscow through the organisation of soviets (Luong 2004: 4; DSD 2014). 
Considering the geographic relations and Soviet past arguably provides an understanding for the 
close relations of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan with Russia. For Kazakhstan moreover the 
proximity of Russia means that their communal relations date further back. Gradually, what 
today constitutes Kazakhstan was piece by piece integrated into the tsarist empire until the 1820s 
(LC 2006: 2). Turkmenistan, conversely, kept the Russian forces in check until 1881 saw the 
overpowering of the last Turkmen resistance (LC 2007: 2). Since then both Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan have been under Russian rule in one form or another (Roy 2000: 31, 32) and this 
has had a significant impact on both countries.  
                                                             
6 Also known as Niyazov, which was his birth name. Turkmenbashi was his own title. The references made in this report to 
Turkmenistan's former President as Turkmenbashi is not intended to imply normative or political connotations.  
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As stated in the introduction, in this report the most important aspect of the Soviet legacy is its 
influence on the current state structure and regime types. In both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
the state apparatus, health care, education system
7
 and vital infrastructure, etc. were established 
by the Soviet power and in the context of the Soviet system (Luong 2004: 6; Roy 2000: 33). 
After independence the respective communist party leaders of the two countries remained in 
power in accordance with previous structural lines (Luong 2004: 1, 12). Among others the Soviet 
traits included a deeply centralised and authoritarian state, which had far-reaching control over 
society (Luong 2004: 6; ICG 2007: 3). Consequently the currently identifiable authoritarian 
regime type in both countries makes for a key feature of Soviet legacy (ICG 2007: 3; Kubicek 
1998: 29). Both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have inherited extremely well organised and 
effective intelligence agency and security apparatus (ICG 2007: 20), which arguably provide an 
explanation as to how both countries have maintained their centralised regimes. Furthermore, 
Soviet patronage structure and widespread corruption, which prevailed in Central Asia, were only 
cemented further after independence due to power consolidation efforts of presidents 
Turkmenbashi and Nazarbayev in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, respectively (Luong 2004: 13; 
Farwick 2005; Schmitz 2013: 113). 
In terms of economic structures, during the Soviet era both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
were part of the greater Soviet economy, playing specific roles in the production system (LC 
2007: 6; LC 2006: 6). As a consequence, several industries were rendered unprofitable after 
independence without the economic sustenance of subsidies from Moscow (LC 2007: 6). In 
Kazakhstan this resulted in several industries breaking down, whereas in Turkmenistan President 
Turkmenbashi largely extended the Soviet subsidising practice (LC 2006: 6; LC 2007: 6). 
But the Soviet legacy is not only manifested in the regime type and economic structures of 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. As part of the greater Soviet development strategy a large group 
of Germans and Russians were resettled in both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (Pohl 2001: 2, 8). 
The last decade of the Soviet Union both state apparatuses’ were heavily dominated by ethnic 
Russians and Germans meanwhile Kazakhstanis and Turkmens were side-lined (Luong 2004: 
132). The post-independence exodus and consequent brain-drain significantly weakened the 
know-how in both countries (Bendini 2013: 4; Pomfret 2010: 861). This applies in particular to 
Kazakhstan: in its first years of independence 2 million Russian-speaking people including 
                                                             
7 Oliver Roy even argues that the education system can be traced back to the tsarist period (Roy 2000: 33) 
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750,000 ethnic Germans emigrated due to ethnic tensions (Luong 2004: 131; Zayinchkovskaya et 
al. 2005: 11).  
The cultural influence of the Soviet Union and before that the tsarist empire is another 
important aspect of Soviet legacy in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Crucially, a specific ethnic 
identity was promoted as part of a larger process of state building and power consolidation. This 
included the exclusion of Muslim identity, which had previously been strong in both Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan (Roy 2000: 25-30, 74). The Cyrillic language was also promoted as an 
imperialistic practice to achieve effective Russification (Roy 2000: 54, 55) and the prevailing 
nomadic lifestyle of most groups in Kazakhstan was forbidden under Soviet rule (LC 2006: 1; 
Roy 2000: 32). In Turkmenistan this forced Russification left comparatively less of an impact 
(Roy 2000: 33), which may be explained by nationalism having been more widespread 
historically compared to other Central Asian states (Pomfret 2013: 65). This also comes to show 
after independence when the notion of heroic Turkmen people who fought against the tsarist 
empire was used in the process of what might be called Turkmenising – an active and intentional 
framing of all previous groups of people living in present day Turkmenistan as Turkmens (Roy 
2000: 167). Similarly, in Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev has promoted the Kazakh national 
identity in order to consolidate and legitimise his authoritarian rule (Ipek 2008: 1192).  
In sum, as is the case for any former Soviet countries both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have 
been and are to a large extent still permeated by their Soviet legacy. As outlined above this is 
evident in their close relationship with Russia, in their authoritarian regime types and in their 
economic structures. However the two countries have developed differently especially in the first 
15 years of existence, despite a highly similar point of origin. The specific strategies of the two 
countries will be analysed in depth in the second analytical chapter (chapter 5). 
 
4.3 The geopolitics of pipelines  
The geographical characteristics of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan as described above become 
further evident when considered in the context of pipelines, which form the infrastructure of gas 
and oil. Several observers emphasise their strategic dimension in the political economy of 
hydrocarbons. This is illustrated by the notion of a “geopolitics of pipelines” (Peyrouse 2012: x) 
and the argument that landlocked countries such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan inherently lack 
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at least partial control of their natural resources since they need to traverse other countries' 
territories in order to reach export markets. Thus;  
 
  Whoever controls the pipelines controls the energy they contain [and] the struggle 
  for control of these pipelines is now being waged, quietly but surely (Jameson  
  2007).  
 
In this perspective pipelines are central to the geopolitical contexts and potential role of 
hydrocarbons in the economic developments of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. By extension this 
also makes it important to consider the actors involved in the infrastructure of the respective 
hydrocarbon economies of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.  
Engaging foreign companies as means to develop the economic potential of their natural 
resources, especially oil, made up a key priority in the development strategies of the Central 
Asian states in the wake of their inception. In particular, this applies to Kazakhstan, which sought 
to liberalise big portions of its extraction sector and invite multinational companies to play a 
central role (Tsalik 2003: 136; Abazov 2008: 41; Chow & Hendrix 2010: 31). This ambition is to 
be seen in connection with the strong desire of Central Asian states to enhance their political and 
economic independence in general and from Russia in particular (Ipek 2008: 1185). Only limited 
volumes of oil were extractable at that time however, for which reason the range of foreign 
companies initially entering the region sought to utilise the Soviet production, transportation and 
pipeline system already in place. Thus, rather than establish new routes and infrastructure 
independently, the first largely western oil companies, such as American Chevron in 
Kazakhstan's Tengiz oil field, intended to upgrade and expand existing infrastructure through 
cooperation with Russian oil pipeline monopoly Transneft (Pomfret 2010: 864; Chow & Hendrix 
2010: 31-34). Considering the willingness of Chevron and other companies entering the region to 
invest in the Russian pipelines, it seems only logical that Russia should capitalise on this historic 
opportunity to link its transportation infrastructure onto the global market. Counter to this logic, 
however, cooperation with Russia proved rather difficult. Instead, due to Russian “(...) political 
ambition and commercial obstinacy” (Chow & Hendrix 2010: 31-32), Chevron, and other 
companies in similar situations, were forced to establish alternative ways of transportation. Not 
only did Russia's poor handling of the important initial encounters with the first-movers of oil 
companies in Central Asia result in missing the impressive economic benefits to be gained from 
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the extremely valuable oil fields such as Kazakhstani Tengiz (Jameson 2007): It also incentivised 
Chevron and other major companies to develop routes and infrastructure that in fact 
circumvented Russia (Herberg 2010: 4). Through these early encounters with Russia, the interests 
of western oil companies thus came to coincide with those of the Central Asian national elites, 
who furthermore gained strong financial backing in the process (Chow & Hendrix 2010: 32). 
Thereby, for large parts of Central Asia including Kazakhstan, their hopes were realised: the 
Russian pipeline network dominance over Central Asian oil and gas flows was decreased
8
 and, 
crucially, the development of new, complex, multi-billion dollar pipeline infrastructure projects 
was spearheaded by foreign oil companies which also brought with them the much-needed 
financial, technical, and managerial capacities (Chow & Hendrix 2010: 33). As regards 
Turkmenistan, its experience stands out in stark contrast to other Central Asian states such as 
Kazakhstan (Abazov 2008: 44). Adhering to its aforementioned all-encompassing refrain from 
engaging with external actors, it rejected all of the international oil companies' proposed 
investments in its major onshore fields (Abazov 2008: 44). Consequently, it: “(…) remained 
largely dependent on the Russian transport route for gas” (Chow & Hendrix 2010: 33).  
 
Gas transportation (IEA 2012: 7) 
                                                             
8 The majority of Kazakhstani oil exports are still, however, channeled through Russia (Laruelle & Peyrouse 2013: 175) 
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Oil transportation routes (IEA 2012: 2)  
 
In sum, pipelines comprise a crucial aspect of the geopolitical dynamics in the Central Asian 
region, and the different actors contest in making the most beneficial deals securing both profits 
and sufficient supply for the ongoing growth in their respective countries. Especially in regards to 
gas, pipelines comprise the material manifestation of contestation and geopolitical strategies – 
both from states struggling to take advantage of the natural resources in their possession and 
countries in desperate need hereof. The following section focuses on how especially Russia and 
China influence this geopolitical situation. 
 
4.4 Setting the geopolitical scene – A changing reality 
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan indisputably play important roles in the Russian gas and oil 
strategies (Pomfret 2013: 74). Turkmenistan's centrality is based in the logic that by Russia 
importing Turkmen gas, that is, diverting Turkmen gas exports away from the European market, 
Turkmen gas is prevented from becoming competition to Russian gas on the European market. 
Thereby Russia is able to continue selling its gas at a high price on the European market (Pomfret 
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2013: 74-75). Thus, the importance of Turkmenistan and its gas is directed by Russia's strategic 
objective of maintaining its dominance of the European gas market as its vital supplier (Pomfret 
2013: 74-75). A similar logic can be applied to Kazakhstan's centrality in Russian oil policy. In 
fact, Russia's Central Asia pipeline policy is more focused on controlling direct export routes to 
Europe than on Central Asia per se, where its engagement has not proven economically beneficial 
and is mired with unprofitable delays (Chow & Hendrix 2010: 35). This is felt by Turkmenistan 
and Kazakhstan, for example, where Russia continuously postpones the “ (…) much-needed and 
long-planned repair and upgrading” of the Soviet Central Asia-Centre gas pipeline and thus fails 
to capitalise as planned on transporting gas from Turkmenistan to Russia via Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan (Chow & Hendrix 2010: 35). Russia's apparently weakening dominance and 
prioritisation of the Central Asian hydrocarbon infrastructure becomes even more evident when 
pitted against the simultaneous increasing role of China.  
Chinese companies, arriving much later in Central Asia than the initial major Western oil 
companies, signed their first deal in the Caspian region in 1997 when the China National 
Petroleum Company (CNPC) obtained the rights to the Aktobe field of Kazakhstan including the 
Zhanazhol oil and gas condensate field and the Kenyiak oil field (Chow & Hendrix 2010: 36). 
Interestingly, China's interest in Central Asian oil and, in part gas, was partly also driven by 
Russia, due to the same mismanagement delaying an agreed-upon oil pipeline between Russia 
and China. As a result, China was apparently forced to seek alternative supply. This was good 
news for Kazakhstan: in 2004 it was announced that China would invest in establishing a 2.800 
km pipeline from western Kazakhstan to Xinjiang. Completed in 2009, this route in fact forms a 
new pipeline route, currently used to transport Russian crude oil from Western Siberia to China 
(Chow & Hendrix 2010: 37) – a practice which arguably underpins the strategic significance of 
this pipeline and, furthermore, points to Kazakhstan's strong potential as transit hub
9
. In a similar 
fashion, Russia's unfavourable conduct incentivised China to seek alternative supplies of gas. 
Thus, since the onshore concession in Turkmenistan in 2006 the CNPC began planning a pipeline 
traversing through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (Chow & Hendrix 2010: 37-38). In light of the 
above, China's engagement in the Central Asian hydrocarbon infrastructure is evidently on the 
increase. Driven by its vast and increasing demand for hydrocarbons to the extent that China is 
even willing to “(...) pre-invest in pipelines from Central Asia before economic volumes of oil 
                                                             
9 Russia has since built the promised ESPO Pipeline from Eastern Siberia with Chinese loans, intended for China and later the 
Pacific Ocean  
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and gas are apparent” (Chow & Hendrix 2010: 38) China has clearly become a player of utmost 
importance to the hydrocarbon sectors in Central Asia. Combined with the simultaneous decline 
of Russia, China's rise has thus fundamentally altered the geopolitical context. However, the far-
reaching consequences of China's rise, as illustrated here, extend beyond the region and the 
respective economies of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. In fact, China's currently leading “(...) 
unprecedented resource boom” (Song 2013: 73) and re-emergence on the global economic stage 
over the past 30 years is fundamentally changing the global political economy dynamics. This 
relates in particular to the broadly accepted assumption of the inevitable process of declining 
terms of trade. Raul Prebisch was among the first to argue that over time the demand for 
agricultural goods would decline relative to demand for manufacturing goods (Schwartz 2010: 
237). The declining terms of trade would cause economic stagnation due to balance-of-payment 
crises (Schwartz 2010: 237; Kaplinsky 2006: 983). According to Schwartz (2010) Prebisch 
would argue that this would require a shift from a natural resource export development strategy to 
a manufacturing investment-oriented strategy (Schwartz 2010: 59, 60). This shift was important 
not only due to declining terms of trade but also in order to utilise Verdoorn’s law of learning by 
doing (Schwartz 2010: 237). However, this generally accepted understanding of the global 
commodity market and its dynamics is fundamentally challenged by the current rapid Chinese 
industrialisation in that it is radically changing the “(…) fundamental relationships between 
commodities and economic growth” (Song 2013: 73). Naturally, global commodity prices are of 
utmost importance for a country pursuing a development strategy based on exporting 
commodities. As such, for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and their development prospects 
China's behaviour and development has immense consequences in that China’s increasing 
demand for oil and gas has changed the potentials for hydrocarbon export development strategies 
(Song 2013; Kaplinsky & Farooki 2012; Kaplinsky & Messner 2008; Kaplinsky 2006). 
 
4.5 Sub-conclusion 
This part of the analysis provides several key findings which are important for the further 
investigation. First, Central Asia is an increasingly relevant region in the perspectives of the 
global geopolitical strive for hydrocarbon resources. Second, the fact that geographical 
characteristics of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan play a central role in their room for 
manoeuvring, respectively, is seen in the way this shapes the possibilities for Turkmen gas export 
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to China and Iran as well as the Kazakhstani ambition to become the transit hub of Central Asia. 
Moreover, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan’s Soviet legacies are relevant to include, when trying to 
understand their close relationship with Russia, their authoritarian regimes and their economic 
structures. 
Furthermore, parts of this economic structural legacy becomes apparent in the pipeline 
infrastructure where especially Turkmenistan has been and still is highly dependent on Russia, 
even though Russia’s influence in the region is diminishing. This dependence has fostered a need 
for diversifying hydrocarbon export routes, which becomes even more interesting in the light of 
the last key finding of this chapter, namely the changing terms of trade. The propagated notion of 
a declining terms of trade and the derived need for diverting the national economy away from 
exporting natural resources towards manufacturing goods has fundamentally changed due to 
primarily China's immediate unstoppable demand for natural resources. In combination, these 
trends and characteristics constitute the geopolitical dynamics of Central Asia, in which 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are trying to develop.   
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5. The development strategies of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
In this second part of the analysis the development strategies of both Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan will be examined. The outcome of these strategic decisions will then be scrutinised 
in the following chapter. The chapter starts with unravelling the leaders' visions for the two 
countries' development with a view to identifying how the resources are managed politically by 
the national authorities as part of broader strategies for economic development. Next, the two 
strategies will be pitted against each other, highlighting commonalities in and divergences 
between them. In addition to official policy documents the chapter draws on several academic 
sources in an effort to enhance the level of analysis above merely repeating official policy 
documents or government propaganda.  
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan like the rest of 
Central Asia faced the pressing challenge of constructing a completely new development strategy 
independent from Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union states (Pomfret 2010: 859). 
Having constituted one of the most well-integrated parts of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan's 
economic policy in the early 1990s of strong liberalisation and measures of privatisation can be 
explained as Kazakhstan following Russia's lead in an endeavour to maintain its close ties to its 
northern neighbour (Abazov 2008: 41; Pomfret 2010: 859, 861; FAO 1995). Today this is 
reflected in the fact that Kazakhstan is the state of the Caspian Sea region
10
 with the highest 
proportion of private-owned assets (EIA 2013A: 6). In 1993 shortly after gaining independence, 
Turkmenistan launched a ten-year development plan with the main objective of becoming the 
'Kuwait of Central Asia' (EIA 2013A: 7). But opposite Kuwait Turkmenistan refrained from 
opening up its economy – President Turkmenbashi declared in 1992 that the people of 
Turkmenistan had the right to its natural resource wealth and founded the state-owned oil and gas 
companies Turkmengaz and Turkmenneft, respectively (EIA 2013A: 7). This strategy “(…) 
retained the ownership structure inherited from the Soviet Union” and “[h]eavy restrictions” on 
foreign direct investment (FDI) resulted in modest development of the energy resources (EIA 
2013A: 7) which in a country that bases its development strategy on becoming the Kuwait of 
Central Asia must be seen as problematic.  
                                                             
10 In this report the Caspian Sea region is defined as the five littoral states of Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and 
Azerbaijan (EIA 2013A: 1) 
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5.1 The strategy of Kazakhstan 
Among other aspects, Kazakhstan's liberalisation strategy made it possible for FDI’s to flow into 
the extractive sector (EIA 2013A: 6). Concretely this manifested itself in the sale of a majority of 
shares of the state-owned oil company to foreign investors, as was also shown in chapter 4. In 
1997 President Nursultan Nazarbayev and his administration embarked upon the "Strategy for 
Development of Kazakhstan until the year 2030" (Nazarbayev 1997). This ambitious document 
represents the official overall government development strategy comprising seven key long-term 
objects (Nazarbayev 1997: 14-15), ranging from national security and stability over health, 
education and well being of the population, to infrastructure and economic growth (Pres.kz 
N.A.). From this long-term strategy three short-term strategies were formulated each covering a 
decade. The 2030 strategy is currently in its second stage of implementation, namely the 
"Strategic Plan for Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan until 2020" (Pres.kz. N.A.). This 
was approved in early 2010 by Presidential Decree along with the "2010-2014 State Program of 
Forced Industrial and Innovative Development" (Gov.kz N.A.). The 2020 Strategic Development 
Plan bears witness to the fact that it came into effect during the financial crisis in its focus on 
enhancing the stability of the national economy (Pres.kz. N.A.). In addition to coming out of the 
crisis stronger than before, the Kazakhstani state's priorities involve the “(…) provision of the 
economy's sustained growth by way of accelerated diversification through industrialisation and 
infrastructure development” (Pres.kz N.A.) with the objective of a competitive and diversified 
economy. In all three documents, as the latter phrase illustrates, the interlinked notions of 
diversification, private sector and increasing non-oil sectors' contribution to growth figure 
centrally, both denoted as objectives in themselves and as measures through which to attain the 
overarching goal of socio-economic development towards 2030 (Pres.kz N.A; WBG. 2013A:  1-
5). 
Shortly after independence Kazakhstan’s leaders believed that natural resources and especially 
oil would be the main driver of economic development (Abazov 2008: 41). Kazakhstan had 
inherited a relatively diversified economy from the Soviet Union period with an extended 
pipeline and railroads structure already in place (Abazov 2008: 41). Interestingly, the 
abovementioned Kazakhstani strategies indicate that the main drivers of economic development 
comprise both the utilisation of its natural resources and the strategic usage of its geopolitical 
position (Nazarbayev 1997). With its long stretches of borders with both Russia and China, 
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Kazakhstan has the potential of acting as the central energy transit hub connecting the Far East 
with Europe as it historically has done with other commodities for nearly two thousand years 
(Abazov 2008: 1). This geographic advantage is clearly at the forefront of Kazakhstan's 
development plans, as is illustrated for instance by considering the plans for developing its 
electricity sector. In addition to upgrading and modernising its electricity networks with the aim 
of improving efficiency of production and distribution
11
 it has been declared that all future 
constructions of power stations must be accompanied by transmission lines. The reason for this is 
precisely the objective of providing transit for Central Asian electricity to Siberia from which 
Kazakhstan would stand to benefit due to transit fees (Laruelle & Peyrouse 2013: 226). Arguably, 
this example also relates to the ways in which Kazakhstan seeks to benefit from its hydrocarbons 
in that improving the efficiency of electricity production and distribution in the north of 
Kazakhstan is also aimed at increasing sales to – and thus profits from – the local metal and 
petrochemical industries (Laruelle & Peyrouse 2013: 226). As such the electricity sector clearly 
exemplifies not only how Kazakhstan aims to diversify its economy but also how it intends to 
utilise its geography and its geopolitical context to spur economic development
12
. 
 
5.2 The strategy of Turkmenistan 
The demise of Turkmenbashi the Great in 2006 and the consequent transition of power in 
Turkmenistan shifted hands generated a great deal of speculation among observers (Jameson 
2007). The initial expectations for the successor, former Minister of Health and Deputy Prime 
Minister Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov were largely optimistic, owing to his announced 
departure from and reversal of some of the more radical social and economic policies of his 
predecessor's reign (EBRD 2010: 3). As an indication of this a new Constitution incorporated the 
principle of separation of powers for instance (EBRD 2010: 3). Moreover, the Berdimuhamedov 
government has declared and apparently pursued an interest in broadening and deepening the 
country's international relations in a hitherto unseen way (WB 2013C: ii). This can be arguably 
be interpreted as an acknowledgment of the economic difficulties potentially associated with a 
foreign policy doctrine of isolationism, for instance in terms of lack of FDI. 
                                                             
11 Electricity loss during transport and distribution caused by poor infrastructure currently forces Kazakhstan to import electricity 
despite its abundant production (Laruelle & Peyrouse 2013: 226) 
12 The electricity sector is used here exclusively as an illustrative example of Kazakhstan's aspirations in this regard and will not 
form an independent part of the remainder of the investigation 
 46 
 
According to the Turkmen Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by means of national and state programs 
extensive reforms are underway “(...) which are aimed at the diversification of the national 
economy and at the achievement of innovative character” (MFA.tm 2013). Apparently in an 
effort to harmonise the range of such programs, Turkmenistan adopted the National Programme 
for Socio-economic Development of Turkmenistan in the period of 2011-2030 on May 14 2010 
(Gov.tm N.A.: 2). Currently the 2012-2016 phase of the program is being implemented. High 
growth rates, macroeconomic stability and development of the private sector form the program's 
guiding principles alongside the goal of “(...) a fundamental improvement in the living standards 
of the population” (Gov.tm N.A.; WBIFC 2013: i). Adhering to these principles, the programme 
aims to have attained the following objectives, among others, by 2030;  
 
  [A] more diversified economy less reliant on the extraction and export of   
  hydrocarbons and other minerals; more agricultural and other products produced  
  domestically; increasing use of alternative, renewable sources of energy; and  
  mainstreaming of modern methods for protecting the country's ecology (WBIFC  
  2013: i).  
  
With the 2011-2030 Program, it is evident that Turkmenistan's strategy for socioeconomic 
development is based firmly in its possession of hydrocarbons. Turkmenistan aims to gain both 
from the hydrocarbon sector itself and its development, and from capitalising on the demand for 
access to them through international cooperation over expanding and extending transportation 
infrastructure (MFA.tm 2013). The former is indicated by the aim of structural diversification of 
the Turkmen energy sector. According to the MFA this is currently in progress “(...) through the 
creation of new, primarily, process industries, based on hydrocarbon raw material” (MFA.tm 
2013).  
Considering the repeated references made to the country's geographical location and its impact 
on its economic development, a strong awareness of  its geopolitical context is apparent in 
Turkmenistan's strategy for socioeconomic development (MFA.tm 2013). In fact, the “(...) 
peculiar geographic location” of the country is presented directly as forming part of the 
reasoning for the Turkmen behaviour with respect to the matter of export of its hydrocarbons 
(MFA.tm 2013). With reference to its vast proven reserves of natural gas and its geographic 
location Turkmenistan's policy of diversification of international cooperation in the energy sector 
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emphasises “ (…) equal partner access to the sources of Turkmen hydrocarbons and their means 
of delivery” (MFA.tm 2013) and the need to develop new export routes for getting its resources 
to their destinations.  
 
5.3 Comparison of the Kazakhstani and Turkmen development strategies 
As was shown in the previous chapter Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan share the overarching 
objective common to all Central Asian states, namely that of minimising excessive reliance on 
individual external actors and states. This arguably provides part of the explanation for the 
evident aim of diversifying international cooperation and export routes in the respective 
development strategies of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.  
As for Kazakhstan, in terms of the recently discovered colossal reserves in the offshore 
Kashagan oil field, transit via Iran constitutes a complicated yet potential option. Whereas 
political conditions will clearly be a decisive factor at the end of the present decade when 
Kashagan's large oil volumes will be pumped, such route will be able to hatch onto Iran's existing 
pipeline network. In addition to this economic advantage, this will also serve to diversify its lines 
of transportation (Chow & Hendrix 2010: 35). Diversification of its international cooperation is 
also at the forefront of Turkmenistan's development strategy. In addition to its links to Russia and 
Iran, Turkmenistan is undoubtedly looking south, seeking to establish transport corridors to 
Pakistan and further to India, via Afghanistan (Laruelle and Peyrouse 2013: 182; MFA.tm 2013), 
and east towards China. Turkmenistan's strong desire to diversify its hydrocarbon trade partners 
was promoted by Russian practice in the early 1990s of actively using its control of gas pipelines 
to pressure Turkmenistan by simply closing the pipelines (Peyrouse 2012: 171). In the late 1990s 
this experience arguably motivated Turkmenistan to establish a pipeline to Iran. Its strategy of 
limiting Russian dominance via Gazprom has become increasingly successful in recent years. 
This needs to be considered in connection with the growing Chinese interest in Turkmen gas 
alongside the economic development of China, Iran and India (Peyrouse 2012: x, 169). Pertaining 
to the objective of diversifying its trade partners is the objective of finding new gas export routes 
southward. Plans for connecting Turkmenistan with Pakistan and India through Afghanistan are 
in progress and the construction of the so-called TAPI pipeline is set to commence in 2018 
(WBG 2013B: 3). Important obstacles stand in the way of translating the geostrategic potential of 
Turkmen gas into economic development, and Turkmenistan's potential from profiting from the 
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global strive for natural resources is far from realised (Peyrouse 2012: 169). This entails an 
extensively neglected or partially absent pipeline infrastructure (Abazov 2008: 41; Chow & 
Hendrix 2010). In fact, the pipeline infrastructure currently in place is deemed insufficient to 
increase its hydrocarbon export (EIA 2012: 1). The much-needed repairs, upgrades, 
modernisations and expansions of the existing networks strongly necessitate foreign investments. 
Foreign investments now constitute a key priority in Turkmenistan's energy policy, which 
comprises both exploitation and extraction of (new) reserves as well as its transportation and 
export (Peyrouse 2012: 171-176). Two obstacles impede foreign investors from engaging with 
Turkmenistan. First, historically investments by foreign companies in Turkmen gas fields were 
denied, as was shown in the previous analytical chapter. Since the early years of independence 
this has now changed, most notably as regards Turkmenistan's offshore sites where a wide range 
of foreign companies currently operate
13
. Yet the only companies to have been granted 
permission to exploit onshore are CNPC (China) and ENI (Italy) (Peyrouse 2012: 173). With the 
transfer of power to current President Berdimuhamedov rhetoric has signalled that this may 
change, though the jury is still out on whether significant improvements will occur (Jameson 
2007; Peyrouse 2012: 171). The second noteworthy obstacle inhibiting foreign investments 
relates to Turkmenistan's currently poor and opaque decision-making structures (Peyrouse 2012: 
173). In business climate assessments (which involve institutional environment and corruption 
among others), Turkmenistan illustratively ranks poorly in terms of its capacity to attract foreign 
direct investment and being a country to do business with (Laruelle & Peyrouse 2013: 138). In 
fact, at times Turkmenistan is not even included in such rankings due to excessively poor 
performance or lack of access to data (Laruelle & Peyrouse 2013: 138). By comparison, 
Kazakhstan is clearly the more liberalised and since independence has actively invited foreign 
investments. This apparently links to the previous analytical chapter, in which Kazakhstani 
engagement of foreign oil companies predated that of Turkmenistan considerably. As for oil 
exploitation in Kazakhstan, one analyst observes that “[d]espite the early Tengiz agreement with 
Chevron (...) the involvement of foreign actors in exploration and exploitation was delayed (...)” 
(Pomfret 2010: 864). Yet Kazakhstan has since gained various benefits from its openness towards 
foreign companies in the form of technology transfers (Laruelle & Peyrouse 2013: 183). 
Turkmenistan, by contrast significantly lags behind in this regard as a testimony to fifteen years 
                                                             
13 These are: Petronas (Malaysia), Butten (GB), Dragon Oil (Dubai), Mobil (USA), Kern Energy (Canada), Texuna (GB) 
(Peyrouse 2012: 173) 
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of isolationism (Peyrouse 2012: 171). Despite its considerable openness to the external world vis-
à-vis that of isolationistic Turkmenistan – which is reflected in its significantly higher capacity to 
attract FDI – in assessments of Kazakhstan as a country to do business with, much is still to be 
desired (Laruelle & Peyrouse 2013: 138). Though it has in recent years been deemed extremely 
successful in implementing reforms to improve the business climate, much like the bulk of 
Central Asian states Kazakhstan's business climate is thus poor and the priority of ameliorating 
this is key to the state's strategy for development (Laruelle & Peyrouse 2013: 138; WB snapshot 
2013).  
 
5.4 Sub-conclusion 
The development trajectories pursued by Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have diverged greatly in 
their first 15 years as independent states. While Kazakhstan underwent extensive liberalisation 
and privatisation measures, Turkmenistan instead closed itself off from the surrounding world. 
Since the shift in power in Turkmenistan in 2006 however the two countries strategies of 
diversification have become very much alike. 
Both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have so far declaredly attempted to utilise their respective 
hydrocarbon resources as drivers of economic development and at the same time tried to actively 
use these resources together with their respective geographic location as geopolitical leverage. 
Moreover both countries base their development strategies primarily on their hydrocarbon 
abundance with a clear awareness of the importance of diversifying their economy so as to reduce 
their reliance on them. The next chapter will go into depth with the actual development in 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in order to analyse how (if at all) these development strategies are 
changing the economic and socioeconomic realities. 
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6. Economic development of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
This third and final part of the analysis is centred on the tangible influence of Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan’s strategies of natural resource management on their economic development. The 
focal point is the management of their natural resources and how the changing geopolitical and 
global political economy dynamics have affected their economic development. 
This will be operationalised by investigating key economic, political and social factors as 
described in the theory chapter. Through an analysis of economic growth and Dutch disease, 
rentier state tendencies, and the socioeconomic parameters of poverty, inequality and education 
which relate to living standards this last part of the analysis will compare the developments in 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. This part of the analysis will serve as a merger between the 
geopolitical and global political economy dynamics identified in the first part of the analysis and 
the hydrocarbon-based development strategies identified in the second part. Through an 
amalgamation with the above-mentioned economic, political and socioeconomic parameters, this 
will form a valid and comprehensive foundation for answering the Problem Statement. 
 
6.1 Economic growth  
When investigating the economic development of a given country, economic growth appears as a 
relevant point of departure in order to assess overall economic tendencies over time. But, as 
discussed in the methodology chapter, it is important to keep in mind the implications which the 
use of the GDP measure might have for the investigation. In spite of the apparent limitations of 
employing GDP measurements, cf. Methodology section 2.5, it will nonetheless enable us to 
attain an assessment of macroeconomic trends and in relation to the resource curse literature GDP 
is, despite the methodological difficulties, still relevant. 
Authors of the resource curse literature often highlight impeded economic growth as a 
consequence of the dynamics of the resource curse (Gylfason 2004; Sachs & Warner 1995). In 
this part of the analysis, the growth of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan is scrutinised by including 
growth in GDP and the development of the demand for oil and gas. 
In the initial years following independence both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan were 
characterised by a devastating negative growth in GDP, highlighting the difficulties of 
restructuring the economies of the two countries after having been integrated into the economy of 
the Soviet Union (Hoen & Irnazarov 2013: 25; Pomfret 2013: 64; Ahrens & Hoen 2013: 7). 
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However at the end of the 1990s, despite substantial year-to-year fluctuations, the development of 
growth in GDP in both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan changed drastically and has continued 
almost without exception to show impressive growth rates until today (EBRD 2013A; EBRD 
2013B; WB 2014A; WB 2014B; Ahrens & Hoen 2013: 7). While reliable numbers concerning 
the level of growth in Turkmenistan are exceedingly difficult to obtain, a compilation of 
calculations from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (10,7 %) and the 
World Bank (11,2 %) indicate an average growth in GDP of around 11 % annually from 2004-
2012. This arguably makes for a high level of growth (EBRD 2013B; WB 2014B; Pomfret 2013: 
68). Compared to the remaining four Central Asian countries, Turkmenistan is emphasised as the 
country with the best performance in terms of economic growth over the last decade (Ahrens & 
Hoen 2013: 7). The equivalent numbers of Kazakhstan by comparison reveal a slightly lower 
growth in GDP of approximately 7 %. This is however still high compared to most of the other 
countries in the region (EBRD 2013A; WB 2014A; Ahrens & Hoen 2013: 7-8).  
When measured in GDP the high levels of growth do not substantiate the resource curse 
expectation that the dependence on natural resources in any way impedes the economic growth of 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (see section 6.1). The question is therefore why these high levels 
of growth occur when the resource curse literature predicts otherwise. The changing dynamics of 
terms of trade provide parts of the explanation for this, cf. the first analytical chapter (chapter 4). 
Without taking into account the specifics of the actual contracts made between the two states and 
foreign oil and gas companies, respectively, global demand for oil and gas comprises a crucial 
factor in the economic development of the two countries. China plays a key role in the increasing 
commodity demand (UNCTAD 2013: 52), which is central to the current impressive growth in 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Phrased differently, the ongoing economic growth in both 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan cannot be understood without looking at China. In recent years, 
the oil and gas market has been spared from severe fluctuations, due primarily to Chinese 
demand, which arguably has supported Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan' pursuits of hydrocarbon-
led development seeing as rents have increased. The impact of China as the main driver of the 
changing terms of trade dynamics is especially evident in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan since, 
due to the proximity of China, it enables not only oil but also gas export (see 3.1 for the 
peculiarities of oil and gas).  
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The economic growth of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan is however merely one part of economic 
development cf. the definition of economic development (see section 1.2). Assessed in isolation, 
high economic growth rates both in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are considered a positive 
development and are surprising in that the resource curse literature would predict that a one-sided 
natural resource-based development strategy would lead to declining growth rates. However, this 
discovery leaves out relevant aspects of the general economic development within the two 
countries.  
 
6.2 Dutch disease and diversification  
As presented in the theory chapter, one of the consequences of huge windfall revenues from gas 
and oil export is a currency appreciation, which eventually leads to a loss of competitiveness in 
other export sectors not associated with the natural resource extraction and as a consequence 
hereof has long term negative effects on growth. This section seeks to analyse in depth how the 
Turkmen and Kazakhstani economies are structured by looking at sector concentration and 
diversification and currency appreciation, which are the key selected areas of investigation in 
relation to Dutch disease. 
 
6.2.1 Sector concentration 
As will be recalled from analysis chapters 1 and 2, the former Soviet states of Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan began entering the market economy following independence although 
Turkmenistan was comparatively late to do so. As was the case for both countries the 
development strategies were dominated by oil and gas and, as has been stated earlier, today both 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan still appear highly dependent on oil and gas, respectively. In terms 
of export from natural resource extraction, the numbers vary greatly between the two countries. 
While the gas and oil export of Turkmenistan amounts to around 90 % of total export in 
Kazakhstan it amounts to approximately 60 % (Atlas 2014A; Atlas 2014B). Hydrocarbon export 
revenue as per cent of GDP in Turkmenistan is approximately 40 % while the equivalent number 
for Kazakhstan is approximately 35 % as averages from 2010 to 2012
14
 (WB 2014F). This clearly 
                                                             
14 The data concerning hydrocarbon export revenue as share of GDP is highly dubious. Some sources show an immensely 
different picture with as much as 64.43 % for Turkmenistan and as low as 25.16 % for Kazakhstan (Bendini 2013: 5; ICG 2007: 
20) 
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indicates that economically both countries are highly reliant on their hydrocarbons. Moreover, 
based in these two key economic figures both also display tendencies of Dutch disease.  
Until the end of the 1990s cotton production played an important role in the Turkmen 
economy both in terms of domestic use and exports. Correlating with the rise in hydrocarbon 
demand and the consequently deflected rise in gas prices the Turkmen economy became much 
more dominated by the increasing export revenues from gas extraction (Pomfret 2013: 63). A 
concrete example of both crowding out and protectionism, which will be discussed below, is that 
of the textile industry. Textile factories in Turkmenistan in the mid-1990s bought cotton below 
world market price due to heavy subsidies which shielded the industry from competition and 
sought to sustain the industry. This resulted in negative value-added in that the trousers that were 
produced: “(…) would have cost less to import than the revenue that could have been earned 
from exporting the cotton used as an input (…)” (Pomfret 2013: 68). 
But by the mid-2000s, due to increasing gas prices, Turkmenistan was not facing any overall 
budget problems, even though the cotton sector was shrinking. The cotton sector was however 
not the only non-hydrocarbon sector that was negatively influenced. In general, most industries, 
which are not connected to the resource extraction sector, have experienced stagnation or even 
decline between 2000 and 2010 (Pastor & Rooden 2000: 4
15
; ICG 2007: 27). Among these is the 
agricultural sector the decline of which was fuelled by a decreasing incentive to invest in this 
sector compared to the investment advantages in the gas sector (Pomfret 2013: 70; ICG 2007: 
27). The agriculture sector is important not only in terms of food security. Still today this sector 
comprises one of the most substantial sources of employment in Turkmenistan (ICG 2007: 22) 
and negative consequences of a decline within this particular sector such as unemployment when 
gas revenues continue to soar are not measurable in terms of export and GDP figures. This 
tendency is further highlighted in the resource curse literature as problematic, due to the distinct 
characteristic of the gas and oil sector as being highly non-labour intensive compared to other 
sectors such as the agricultural sector (see theory chapter). Estimations indicate that 
unemployment in Turkmenistan is around 60 % (CIA 2014B; Indexmundi 2013A). However, it 
has not been possible to locate reliable and updated unemployment rates for Turkmenistan and 
thereby fully discuss and investigate the actual effects of hydrocarbon extraction on 
unemployment rates. And even though estimations like the one presented here might be true due 
                                                             
15 Error in original: data from 2010 in a report apparently last edited in 2000 
 54 
 
to the widespread sector concentration in non-intensive sectors, 60 % arguably seems rather 
extreme. 
As indicated in the theory chapter, a response to the possible crowding out of sectors might 
lead countries to introduce protectionist strategies in order to sustain other sectors and to create a 
forced diversification. In the case of Turkmenistan a foreign policy doctrine of isolationism (Roy 
2000: 191) has functioned as an overall protectionist strategy and as exemplified above with the 
textile sector the purpose of protecting the country from foreign engagement and competition 
resulted in even lesser competitiveness. Protectionist policies have also been introduced to restrict 
agricultural goods such as wheat, cotton etc. from being exported (Pastor & Rooden 2000: 13). In 
Kazakhstan protectionism is also evident (WTO 2011: 21, 22) but not on the same scale as in 
Turkmenistan cf. Kazakhstan’s strategy of liberalisation and diversification (Pomfret 2010: 859; 
Pomfret 2009: 187). Since 1995 Kazakhstani farmers and manufacturers have received mild tariff 
protection but in general tariffs are being dismantled (Pomfret 2009: 193). 
In Kazakhstan the development has been permeated by some of the same sector concentration 
dynamics albeit in a different scope. While the country is highly dependent on especially oil 
exports the service sector has experienced a significant increase in share of GDP since 
independence (Bendini 2013: 7), which might be due to diversification policies. The agriculture 
and manufacturing sectors diminished severely in the immediate aftermath of independence due 
to the increasing significance of oil (Pomfret 2010: 869; Pomfret 2009: 192) and competitiveness 
of these sectors was lost generally due to them no longer being subsidised by Moscow (LC 2007: 
6). For the agricultural sector this decline continued until after the millennium when slight 
recovery took hold and production in absolute figures increased (Bendini 2013: 6; WBG 2013: 
4). As stated in the government’s strategy, diversification is a keen priority for Kazakhstan, 
which is expressed through initiatives to differentiate the economy to other non-extractive sectors 
(WBG 2013: 4). This is illustrated by the implementation of tax reforms which have reduced 
taxation in the non-oil sectors (WBIFC 2012: 36). So far, however, diversification initiatives 
have had a limited impact due to among other aspects the boom in commodity prices, which is 
conventionally correlated with reducing incentives to invest in non-extractive sectors. 
Diversification is further crucial in terms of employment, as the agriculture sector employs 
around a third of the population in Kazakhstan compared to the oil and gas industry, which 
directly employs fewer than 0,25 % of the population (Bendini 2013: 6; ICG 2007: 30). The 
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agriculture sector today only comprises 5 % of the total GDP in Kazakhstan (Bendini 2013: 6). 
The unemployment rate in Kazakhstan decreased from 13,5 in 1999 to 8,4 % in 2004, which is 
impressive and low in comparison with Turkmenistan. Held against Kazakhstan’s booming 
economy it is still relatively high (USAID 2006: 57, 60) though recent estimations show a further 
decrease to an unemployment rate average of 5,6 % from 2011 to 2014 (Tradingeconomic 2014; 
Indexmundi 2013B). 
Alongside diversification and sector concentration, currency appreciation is another central 
aspect of the Dutch disease. As outlined in the theory chapter the inflow of windfall foreign 
exchange functions as a catalyst for currency appreciation, which makes it difficult for non-
hydrocarbon export sectors to remain competitive in a global market because export products 
become relatively more expensive. As the above sector concentration already indicated some 
kind of crowding has occurred in both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, but looking into currency 
appreciation will shed further light on this: 
The resource curse literature suggests that Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan ought to show signs 
of currency appreciation. In the case of Turkmenistan, several years of hyperinflation was the 
result of the devastating economic consequences of the dismantling of the Soviet Union and the 
subsequent introduction of Turkmenistan’s own currency in 1993 (Pomfret 2013: 68). The 
exchange rate was set to two manat to one U.S. dollar. Some years and a hyperinflation later, this 
was re-evaluated and the regime introduced an official exchange rate at 5.200 manat to one U.S. 
dollar (Pomfret 2013: 68). But this hyperinflation stopped. From 1995 to 1999 Turkmenistan 
experienced a real exchange rate appreciation meaning that the manat became stronger vis-à-vis 
the foreign currencies of Turkmenistan’s trading partners (Pastor & Rooden 2000: 5). This recent 
development is in accordance with the resource curse literature because exactly this is what the 
Dutch disease is all about – a relative strengthening of the local currency resulting in relative 
deteriorating competitiveness. 
For Kazakhstan the picture is less clear-cut due to conflicting tendencies. Kazakhstan’s growth 
and improvements of the country's economy has been driven by primarily two factors; its 
hydrocarbon export sector and a concurrent depreciation of the its currency (Bendini 2013: 4). 
But new tendencies show that the Kazakh currency tenge has appreciated and that this relative 
strength together with: “(…) an underperforming industrial sector” (Bendini 2013; 5) slow down 
Kazakhstan’s industrial development. Other data show the same tendency of a real appreciation 
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(inflation adjusted) of the tenge. Measured by Growth Regional Product (GRP), which show 
production according to what region it is produced in or extracted from, it becomes clear that this 
appreciation is driven almost exclusively by the oil extraction sector (USAID 20XX: 7). This 
currency appreciation can be seen as the reason for the recent devaluation of the tenge by 
Kazakhstan’s Central Bank (WB 2014C): The tenge has appreciated relative to the Russian ruble 
and other key currencies, prompting the Central Bank to devaluate in order to keep its 
competitive edge and in order to mitigate the Dutch disease dynamics, which are currently being 
seen in Kazakhstan. 
 
6.2.2 Summary 
In general Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are highly dependent on gas and oil, which have had 
detrimental consequences for the remaining sectors in both countries. However, Kazakhstan has 
performed better on different levels compared to Turkmenistan, at least when looking at sector 
diversification. The service sector is growing and the agricultural sector is slowly recovering 
meanwhile policies are focusing on non-extractive sectors of the economy. Having said this 
however, both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are extremely vulnerable to fluctuations of the oil 
and gas prices – a vulnerability that would be reduced if other export sectors composed a larger 
share of the total exports and share of GDP. Especially Turkmenistan has almost no other 
production that would sustain the economy in times of falling gas and oil prices. This means that 
Kazakhstan and especially Turkmenistan rely heavily on the continued favourable terms of trade.  
It seems that the crowding out of the remaining sectors is highly present in Turkmenistan, 
despite, as pointed out in analysis chapter 5, the government’s strategy of trying to avoid exactly 
that. By comparison Kazakhstan has succeeded better in diversifying its export sector, and has 
thereby created a less vulnerable economy, though it is important to underline that Kazakhstan 
remains heavily reliant on its hydrocarbon deposits. Next, an interesting question is how the 
immense revenues on oil and gas have affected the public institutions of Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan? The subsequent section of the analysis wishes to illustrate how the possession of 
hydrocarbon resources has affected the institutional strength and setup of the two countries. 
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6.3 Rentier state tendencies 
So far we have examined the central economic figures of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and have 
thereby arrived at an assessment of the macroeconomic development. As already mentioned, that 
makes up merely one aspect of understanding the economic developments in Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan and how hydrocarbon resources have influenced these developments.  
In this part of the analysis the focus is on how the abundance of hydrocarbons has influenced 
public institutions. Whereas the analytical section above has a purely economic character, this 
will add a more political perspective in that it will investigate how the hydrocarbon abundance 
has affected the political structure in both countries. By looking at rent seeking tendencies, 
income tax, corruption and public spending we are able to assess some of the characteristics of 
the states of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. 
 
6.3.1 Rents and income tax  
As introduced in the theory chapter, the main characteristic of a rentier state is that it is driven or 
financed by rents, which are defined as exogenous revenue from, among other things, extractive 
sectors (Barma et al. 2012: 48; Singh & Bourgouin 2013: 29).  In this report, the characteristics 
of the rentier state are operationalised primarily by looking at the share of income tax of GDP and 
the level of corruption in both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. 
As emphasised in the first part of the analysis (chapter 4) both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
feature as authoritarian regimes and have been so for decades (Luong 2004: 6; ICG 2007: 3). 
Here it will be further analysed what this actually implies for the two countries’ utilisation of 
their hydrocarbon resource wealth.  
In accordance with the resource curse literature, income tax and income tax proportion of a 
state budget may indicate whether a given state shows rentier state tendencies. Karl (1999: 37) 
argues that a negative correlation exists between the share of taxes in a state budget and the 
centralisation of that state through a process of overlapping of the economic and political spheres. 
For Turkmenistan income tax is 10 per cent flat and tax as a share of GDP amounts to 18.4 per 
cent (Deloitte 2014; WB IFC 2013: 13). For Kazakhstan income tax is 10 per cent for citizens 
and 15 for non-citizens while the tax amounts to 23.8 per cent of GDP (EIU 2014; WB IFC 2012: 
64). Logically, however, the relatively low income tax levels are not in and of themselves 
problematic – even less when Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan's state budgets are financed through 
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their immense revenues from hydrocarbon extraction. The counter argument derived from the 
resource curse literature is that when public spending is not funded through broad income tax the 
social contract between the populace and the regime is most often weak (Tsalik 2003: 136). This 
makes the state apparatus less dependent on having a productive and prosperous population 
earning an income, which is possible to tax (Springborg 2013: 302). It also works the other way 
around – when the population pays little or no tax the incentive for critical engagement and 
demand for transparent governance is weakened substantially (Tsalik 2003: 136). This further 
leads to the decoupling of the regime from the people, which will most likely result in or 
consolidate authoritarianism (Karl 1999: 37), as is the case in both Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan. By extension, when a state has little need for non-hydrocarbon revenues to finance 
the state budget the incentives for creating a durable: “(…) productive economy that could 
generate taxable earnings (…)" are low (Springborg 2013: 302). It is thus possible to argue that 
natural resources, or revenue from them, actually reduce the incentive for governments to collect 
taxes from the populace. This weakens the connection between the populace and the ruling body, 
leaving the latter in charge of public spending without necessarily having to treat this 
transparently as a public matter. This will be elaborated below.  
Tax revenue thus appears as a more sustainable form of government income compared to the 
evident risks of being overly reliant on revenues from fluctuating gas and oil prices. Though 
growth levels are currently high in both countries, they are  not reliable in a longer perspective. 
 
6.3.2 Corruption and transparency 
As has been stated earlier in the report, corruption and patronage politics pose problems 
throughout Central Asia (Cooley 2012: 134). Especially Turkmenistan ranks as one of the most 
corrupt countries not only in Central Asia but worldwide (Transparency International 2013: 3
16
; 
EBRD 2013: 39). The problem of corruption is also evident in Kazakhstan but not as severe as in 
Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan has in recent years moved up from the bottom 10 percentile to the 
bottom 20 percentile worldwide (Cooley 2012: 134). According to Transparency International 
Turkmenistan ranks 168 out of 174 while Kazakhstan ranks 140 when measuring the perception 
of corruption in the two countries (Transparency International 2013: 4). It is noteworthy that 
while Kazakhstan has shown gradual improvement (i.e. less perceived corruption), this is not the 
                                                             
16 The Transparency Index is based on expert opinion and public perception of corruption in 177 countries (TI 2013: 1). 
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case in Turkmenistan. Against the economic growth levels measured earlier, this development 
illustrates that although economic growth has risen this has not resulted in less corruption. 
Measured by the Index of Economic Freedom, Turkmenistan’s level of corruption has actually 
worsened the last couple of years while Kazakhstan’s level of corruption has improved (IEF 
2014A; IEF 2014B; IEF 2014C). A related question here is whether the level of corruption is 
connected to the abundance of resources in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan? Though this is 
difficult to answer directly the resource curse literature suggests that the immense revenue and 
the interest of incumbents to maintain their grip of power may increase the levels of corruption 
(see theory chapter). However, it can also be argued that the level of corruption in both 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan is connected to the heritage in these countries, in that corruption 
was equally perceived to be highly present before the discovery, and widespread extraction, of 
resources (Luong 2004: 13; Farwick 2005; Schmitz 2013: 113). In reality, the large revenues 
associated with resource extraction might contribute to increasing the possibility of corruption in 
this context of both countries, especially Turkmenistan. 
In the case of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan it is difficult to corroborate the resource curse 
literature argument that corruption inhibits economic growth, since evidently both countries show 
high levels of growth and widespread corruption. At the same time, however, corruption is 
known to impede foreign investments in these countries (Laruelle & Peyrouse 2013: 138-140), 
and thereby corruption runs counter to the declared priorities in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan's 
development strategies of increased FDI.  
Besides, as the resource curse literature suggests, an indicator of corruption can further be seen 
in the public spending on construction of so-called prestige or mega projects, also referred to as 
‘white elephants’ (Ploeg & Poelhekkey 2009: 736): If highly expensive and extravagant 
construction projects are common it may indicate poor budget management and irrational 
spending of public funds. This becomes highly problematic in countries with poor socioeconomic 
performance. During Turkmenbashi’s rule in Turkmenistan, these prestige projects reached 
absurd heights especially viewed in light of the socioeconomic challenges facing the country in 
these years (Anceschi 2009: 51). In Kazakhstan blatant prestige projects have been less obvious 
compared to those of Turkmenistan even though the construction of the new capital since 1997, 
Astana, could be accused of qualifying as such due to the immense sums spent in its construction. 
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However, the construction of Astana has later been defended as a way to avoid conflicts between 
the north and the south of Kazakhstan (Luong 2004: 131; Zayinchkovskaya et el. 2005: 11).  
Both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have established natural resource wealth funds allegedly 
to secure a transparent and effective management of the means. While Kazakhstan has become a 
member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and, albeit with questionable 
accuracy, has published budgets of the oil and gas funds this is not the case in Turkmenistan, 
which is currently not a member (ICG 2007: 25; EITI 2014). Kazakhstan established the National 
Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan (NFRK) based on a Norwegian model, in which the 
revenues from natural resource extraction is placed. The fund is managed by a council directly 
appointed by the president manages the fund (ICG 2007: 26). This council includes the prime 
minister, minister of finance, central bank chairman, and international institutions. The fund has 
as its declared goal to secure future generations and reduce the possible shocks in periods of 
declining oil and gas prices (ICG 2007: 26). A fund has also been established in Turkmenistan, 
however it is not possible to acquire reliable information from Turkmenistan on how much 
revenue is assigned to the Turkmen state and how this is distributed (ICG 2007: 26-27). This 
once again supports the finding that the Turkmen’s government use of oil and gas rents are 
permeated by insecurity and inaccessibility. The public spending is thus highly opaque, which 
reduces the possibilities for the population to gain insights into the actual spending of this fund in 
Turkmenistan. 
 
6.3.3 Summary 
From the above analysis of public institutions, corruption and public spending, and taxation it is 
possible to argue that Kazakhstan and especially Turkmenistan display rentier state tendencies. In 
terms of corruption and levels of transparency regarding the use of natural resource rents 
Turkmenistan is considerably worse off than Kazakhstan which seems to be progressing in these 
categories. This analysis has thus nuanced the impression of the economic development of 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan: First, it has been demonstrated that income tax as share of GDP is 
low for both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan which represents a potential risk for decoupling the 
ruling body from the populace in the two countries. Furthermore income tax represents a more 
stable source of income for a state budget unlike revenues from natural resources which is the 
case of the two investigated countries. When combined with the high levels of corruption and 
lack of transparency Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan display clear rentier state tendencies. In spite 
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of impressive growth rates in both countries this section has thus clearly shown how the 
hydrocarbon assets, which are highly valuable in terms of economic growth also have severe 
negative  political effects. The purpose of the following section is to further nuance this picture 
by moving from the political-economic to the socioeconomic arena. 
 
6.4 Socio-economic development 
In this section the specific socioeconomic parameters of inequality, wealth, poverty and 
education are analysed in order to provide insight into what consequences the hydrocarbon 
extraction has on the populations of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Considering growth rates 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are examples to be followed. This is called into question the actual 
composition of their respective economies is considered along with the strength of their public 
institutions. This section of the analysis is thus an attempt to illustrate whether the immense 
revenues from oil and gas have “trickled down” to reach the broader populations of the two 
countries. This is deemed relevant in that all included aspects of income inequality, wealth, 
poverty and education are all perceived to form parts of the economic development in both 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan both in a short and longer perspective. For this reason all of the 
above aspects need to be examined in order to answer the Problem Statement. 
To further nuance the perception of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan as countries with high 
economic growth simultaneous with severe institutional challenges this final section of the 
analysis thus aims to scrutinise the social consequences of hydrocarbon extraction on the broader 
population. It should however be emphasised in advance, that some of these indicators are 
impossible to analyse due to lack of reliable data especially from Turkmenistan.  
 
6.4.1 Levels of education  
Economic development requires knowledge, skills and technical know-how, which mean that 
when trying to grasp the economic development of a given country the level of education is of 
importance. But how is this related to hydrocarbon dependence? The resource curse literature 
suggests a correlation between the negative consequences of abundant hydrocarbon resources and 
lack of human capital understood as educational level and literacy rate (Brunnschweiler 2008: 
399; Gylfason 2004). This means that a higher level of education will mitigate the risk of 
negative outcome of hydrocarbons abundance.  
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Education was a cornerstone in the Soviet Union which opposite several other factors actually 
left Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan as relatively well-educated (Laruelle & Peyrouse 2013: 140). 
Still today official literacy rates are 99,8 and 99,6 in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, 
respectively
17
 (CIA 2014A; CIA 2014B). 
In Turkmenistan the extreme repressiveness and control of the regime under Turkmenbashi 
and especially in the years from 1997 to 2006 has also influenced the educational system 
(Laruelle & Peyrouse 2013: 140). As part of consolidating power and the creation of a personal 
cult around Turkmenbashi the geopolitics of isolationism resulted in banning foreign educational 
degrees and a law stating that all education had to be based on Turkmenbashi’s book Ruhnama 
(ICG 2007: 4). Furthermore, the years required to finish university and school were reduced 
(Pomfret 2013: 70). As a result the educational system was more or less destroyed and the 
collective know-how in society diminished (Pomfret 2013: 70; WB IFC 2013: 19; Laruelle & 
Peyrouse 2013: 140). These devastating policies have however been reduced since the death of 
Turkmenbashi in 2006 (ICG 2007: 4) as is also in accordance with the socioeconomic 
development strategy mentioned in section 5.2. Education is free in Turkmenistan and since 2007 
large sums have been channelled to this area (WB IFC 2013: 2, 6). In Kazakhstan the access to 
education is relatively high, which to some extent can be ascribed to the Soviet legacy (Unicef 
2008: 1). But several educational reforms have been implemented including the 2008 decision of 
opening 245 new schools over the following five-year period and the 2006 law to spend 3 % of 
state budget on education (Unicef 2008: 1). This is a clear indication of the Kazakhstani regime 
being aware of the pivotal role of key asset knowledge in relation to economic development. 
As argued by the resource curse, the vast inflow of revenue from natural resource extraction 
reduces the incentives for states to invest in long-term investments such as education. As 
demonstrated in the above, this was especially evident during Turkmenbashi’s rule when national 
education was extremely poor and biased. Fortunately, this has changed in Turkmenistan 
meanwhile it seems that Kazakhstan have pursued a well functioning system for some time. 
 
                                                             
17 We are aware that these numbers are dubious – for instance Laruelle & Peyrouse (2013: 140) argue that literacy rates are 
known to be manipulated  
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6.4.2 Human development  
Poverty is a vague concept and hard to grasp, which in this section means that both official 
poverty line estimations and the UNDP Human Development Index
18
 (HDI) will be employed to 
illustrate how this is affected by natural resource dependence. The argument for involving an 
official poverty line is to establish an overall assessment of the prevalence poverty in Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan. And by using the HDI the understanding of poverty will be broadened by 
adding education and life expectancy to the equation (UNDP 2013: 1). In this report both short 
life expectancy and low educational level are understood as central aspects of being poor. 
Kazakhstan dropped from 54
th
 to 79
th
 on the HDI from 1990 to 2002 (Tsalik 2003: 137), 
which underlines the paramount impact of the dismantling of the Soviet Union on Kazakhstan. In 
the case of Turkmenistan reliable data from the 1990s has not been found but as has been shown 
earlier, the same process probably occurred in Turkmenistan (section 4.2). In 2012 both countries 
figure in the UNDP ranking with Kazakhstan ranked as number 69  and Turkmenistan as number 
102 (UNDP 2013: 143). This places Kazakhstan in the category of ‘high human development’ 
and Turkmenistan in the category of ‘medium human development’. The noteworthy 
development is that Kazakhstan has improved its score each year from 2000-2012 while 
Turkmenistan has shown no significant change
19
 (UNDP 2013: 149) despite its explicit strategy 
to reduce poverty cf. analysis chapter 5. As for Turkmenistan this is a clear indicator of at least 
one thing: institutional change takes time and even if the Turkmen regime’s socioeconomic 
development strategy addresses these issues, the rent seeking trajectories identified in analysis 
part 6.3 are extremely difficult to change. 
Despite the above, minor changes are taking place in both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. 
Since 2007 Turkmenistan has increased spending on increasing living standards of the 
population, but the actual effects are difficult to measure due to limited reliable data (WBIFC 
2013: 2). For Kazakhstan, people living in absolute poverty, which is here defined as having less 
than the equivalent of 1,25 US $ per day in purchasing power has decreased significantly from 
levels of 59 % and 36 % for the rural and urban population respectively in 2001, to 8,8 % and 2,4 
% in 2011 (OECD 2013: 68). This indicates that revenue from the extraction of resources have 
been used to decrease the poverty levels in both countries. 
                                                             
18 We are aware of the fact that HDI includes education as one of three parameters, however we have chosen to analyse education 
separately. 
19 Numbers are not available for every year 
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6.4.3 Inequality and GDP per capita 
Income inequality is relevant to look into in the cases of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan because it 
indirectly shows to what extent hydrocarbon rents benefit the population. As outlined above both 
countries have experienced impressive growth during the last decade, which could be of benefit 
to the broader population. While it has been the intention of the present report to use the GINI 
coefficient
20
 to show the distribution of income in society (Oxford 2014), this is not possible due 
to a lack of updated empirical material from Turkmenistan
21
. However, the available numbers 
highlight that the GINI coefficient rose significantly since independence: In 1988 the coefficient 
was approximately 0,25 and in 1998 it was approximately 0,40 (CIA 2014C; Indexmundi N.A.). 
For Kazakhstan the tendency of increase in inequality was the same from independence to the 
early 2000s, where the coefficient in 2001 was 0,41. However, since 2001 the income inequality 
has decreased significantly (Atakhanova & Howie 2014; Indexmundi N. A.). In 2009 and in 2013 
the coefficient was 0,29 (WB 2014D; UNDP 2013: 153) showing a significant decline compared 
to the 2001 level together with an indication of a consolidation of the level of inequality. In the 
case of Kazakhstan, the argument of the resource literature that resource dependence should 
increase inequality can thus apparently not be substantiated. 
When looking into the development of the two countries, one of the only identifiable 
measurements enabling a direct comparison between them is based on the GDP per capita, PPP 
(current international $) (WB 2014E). This measurement is based on the “(…) gross domestic 
product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates” (WB 2014E). 
These numbers figure as a proxy for “(…) living standards such as health, security and quality of 
life” (ICG 2007: 21). In 1996 Kazakhstan had a GDP per capita PPP measuring 3.705$ while the 
equivalent amount for Turkmenistan was 3.131$, thus roughly corresponding figures (ICG 2007: 
22; WB 2014E). The same numbers from 2012 show a significant difference as Kazakhstan 
measures 21.882$ while that number was 12.678$ for Turkmenistan. Nonetheless it indicates a 
significant increase in both countries (WB 2014E). In total figures Kazakhstan has thus 
progressed significantly compared to Turkmenistan. Held against the collected world average of 
                                                             
20 The GINI coefficient illustrates that if accumulated income is distributed completely equal the coefficient is 0,00, which will 
visually come to show in a curve of 45 degrees. If the income distribution is completely unequal, which is the situation where one 
person earns the entire national income, then the coefficient would be 1,00 and the curve would be horizontal until the percentage 
representing one single person from where it would be perpendicular (Oxford 2014). 
21 For Turkmenistan the GINI coefficient was only measured until 1998 (WB 2014D). The lack of material highlights the 
continuous isolationist behaviour and tight control with the country information about Turkmenistan. 
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GDP per capita PPP, 13.803$, Kazakhstan is highly above average, while Turkmenistan is to be 
found below. As has been illustrated in this report, the countries shared many common features 
upon independence. Yet it appears that Kazakhstan’s resource management to a higher degree 
has benefitted the population and increased its living standards – this is only to a lesser degree 
evident in Turkmenistan. It would have strengthened this finding significantly if we were to 
compare these numbers with the levels of inequality in the two countries, because this could more 
comprehensively establish whether the increase in wealth has been distributed evenly in the two 
countries. Nevertheless, the decreasing inequality levels located in Kazakhstan qualifies as a 
progressive development.   
The above findings thus indicate that the immense revenues from oil and gas actually do 
benefit the populations of both Turkmenistan and especially Kazakhstan. Yet a paramount 
question is whether this wealth ends in the hands of a few or benefits the broader population. 
Especially in the case of Kazakhstan, it is evident that the revenues from resources have 
improved welfare while this is more difficult to answer for Turkmenistan.  
 
6.5 Sub-conclusion 
As has been illustrated in the third section of the analysis, it is evident that the role of 
hydrocarbon dependence highly affects the surrounding societies of Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan. The first section of the analysis demonstrated how both Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan have experienced high levels of growth and that both are fuelled by the extraction 
and export of oil and gas, respectively. When measured in GDP the high levels of growth do not 
apparently validate the resource curse hypothesis that dependence on natural resources impedes 
growth. One possible explanation for this surprising discovery is to be found in the changing 
dynamics of terms of trade on the global market highly fuelled by Chinas increasing commodity 
demand, which has led to a continuous rise in oil and gas prices. As a consequence of this, the 
gas and oil prices have been spared from severe fluctuations, which has rendered it possible for 
both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to pursue this resource led development with high levels of 
growth in GDP.  
Even though both Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have explicitly pursued a development 
strategy of diversification, both countries are highly dependent on natural resources. The sector 
concentration is substantial, and other sectors have suffered tremendously in the shadow of the 
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extraction sectors. However, Kazakhstan has performed better than Turkmenistan in terms of 
diversification thereby reducing the immediate detrimental impacts of declining oil and gas 
prices. It must be emphasised however, that both countries are extremely vulnerable to declining 
prices, as the financial crisis of 2007 was a minor example of. Turkmenistan especially has 
almost no other production to sustain its economy in times of decreasing prices. 
The second part of this chapter found that both Kazakhstan and especially Turkmenistan 
display rentier state tendencies. The immense revenues from natural resource extraction thus 
influence the political environment in certain ways. With Turkmenistan showing massive 
corruption combined with questionable public spending and a lack of transparency concerning 
how the resource revenues are distributed, the natural resource rents have contributed to 
preserving a highly closed and centralised state structure. While Kazakhstan displays some of the 
same tendencies, the lower level of corruption along with initiatives such as the founding of the 
NFRK fund to improve transparency in the use of oil reserves must be seen as a positive 
development.  
The third part of the analysis illustrates that both Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan show progress 
on some of the socioeconomic parameters included. This creates an overall impression of 
prosperity but some of these numbers are relative and it is therefore important to remember that 
the starting points for both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have been very poor, which is evident 
from the HDI rating of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan as 69 and 102, respectively in 2012. On the 
other hand, however, the above findings combined with the strategies identified in analysis 
chapter 5 clearly indicates some progress in both countries – Kazakhstan however once again 
displaying better tendencies compared to Turkmenistan. This is evident in terms of GDP per 
capita development, education as well as HDI where Kazakhstan stands out as having benefitted 
the population more broadly. It must be underlined that the positive development indicated in this 
part of the analysis cannot be attributed to the hydrocarbon deposits but rather to the management 
of them and the targeting of pitfalls associated with hydrocarbon extraction. It is further 
important to make clear that the poor HDI ranking of Turkmenistan does not relate causally to 
Turkmen hydrocarbons. Rather the argument is that the positive as well as negative outcomes 
established in this chapter correlate with the (mis)management of natural resources. Certain 
aspects of the resource curse literature are confirmed quite significantly but – surprisingly – 
others are not. 
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Part 3 
 
Conclusion & Discussion 
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7. Conclusion 
 
In the context of the global strive for natural resources, how do the Central Asian states of 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan utilise their hydrocarbon resources to spur economic 
development?  
 
This investigation has continuously underlined that Central Asia constitutes an increasingly 
significant region in the global strive for hydrocarbon resources. The geographical characteristics 
and Soviet legacy of both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan play a distinct role in the geopolitical 
contexts of the two countries and strongly shape their possibility for manoeuvring between the 
different countries proximate to the region. This is evident in the pipeline infrastructure. 
Especially Turkmenistan appears to have been more heavily influenced by its Soviet past and this 
translated into a pervasive reluctance towards allowing foreign interference in its national 
economy until recently. By contrast Kazakhstan has actively attracted and channelled foreign 
investments into developing its hydrocarbons extraction sector. Whereas Turkmenistan has relied 
excessively on its insufficient and neglected Soviet pipeline infrastructure, Kazakhstan instead 
has sought to utilise the global demand for its resources to diversify its export routes and -
partners. With its implementation of widespread liberalisation and privatisation policies 
Kazakhstan's economic strategy thus appeared in stark contrast to that of Turkmenistan. 
Surprisingly, the two apparently contrasting strategies which Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
pursued were not reflected in similarly contrasting outcomes of economic growth. This 
paradoxical finding can be explained by and indeed testifies to the enormous significance of the 
global demand for hydrocarbons which has evidently levelled out the potentially different 
impacts of the highly different economic strategies.  
As has been argued in this investigation, economic growth constitutes merely one albeit 
important aspect of economic development. Whether the economic growth translates into 
economic development depends strongly on the way in which the natural resource revenues are 
managed. This investigation points to economic development in natural resource-dependent 
countries being a question of political management but notably also has to do with the conditions 
of the global political economy and the distinct geographical features of the resource abundant 
countries. The current development strategies of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan converge greatly 
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as is illustrated by the declared overarching goal of economic diversification including 
development of the private sector. Despite these formulated objectives, the analysis of the 
economic development of the two countries show a discrepancy between their goals and 
observable outcomes.  
The sector concentration is considerable in both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and other 
sectors have been neglected in the shadow of the resource extraction sectors. It can further be 
concluded that both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan display rentier state tendencies fuelled by the 
vast revenues from the natural resource export. The dependence on natural resources has made 
the countries financially less dependent on tax revenues from the population, which hinders the 
mutual dependence between a state and its populace. Moreover, Turkmenistan shows some of the 
highest levels of corruption worldwide and the utilisation of natural resource revenue is 
characterised by a general lack of public accountability and transparency. By contrast, 
Kazakhstan displays lower levels of corruption and a more transparent use of natural resource 
rents. However, stating that Kazakhstan has thereby escaped the resource curse would be 
neglecting the findings established in the analysis. The conclusion that Kazakhstan compared 
with Turkmenistan appears less corrupt and more transparent in its management of resource rents 
in fact testifies to the severity of Turkmenistan's established trends. In terms of socioeconomic 
parameters both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan seem to have improved the overall prosperity of 
their populations. Once again Kazakhstan stands out in terms of GDP per capita, HDI level and 
level of education – all crucial aspects of measuring the well being of a population. This indicates 
that the immense revenues from natural resource extraction appear to have benefitted the 
populace of Kazakhstan more than that of Turkmenistan.  
From this investigation of the range of selected resource curse parameters it appears that 
despite the development strategies, neither Kazakhstan nor Turkmenistan can claim to have 
steered clear of the resource curse. Considered at large, Turkmenistan performs comparatively 
worse than Kazakhstan. Interestingly, however, this difference is not as significant as was 
initially expected based on the extreme isolationism of Turkmenistan and the more apparent 
ambition of rising within the region in the case of Kazakhstan. Despite their differences the two 
countries are both heavily affected by the favourable terms of trade dynamics, which in turn 
provides an explanation for how the two countries have been partly successful in pursuing an 
economic development strategy driven by hydrocarbon export. This does however not change the 
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fact that the economic development trajectories of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan remain highly 
vulnerable to future hydrocarbon price fluctuations.  
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8. Generalisability of investigation 
This discussion will critically reflect upon the degree to which the conclusions of the report are 
generalisable and can be transferred to other contexts, first and foremost within other Central 
Asian countries and subsequently within other regions of the world. When choosing a research 
design like the one present in this report the main objective is to qualitatively engage with a 
specific and well-demarcated area. This implicates that several of the key findings are particular 
to that specific area of research. While this is mainly the case for this report, it is though still 
relevant to discuss whether some of the conclusions can be applied elsewhere. 
First, the theoretical conclusions drawn in the report underline that the way to understand the 
resource curse is through correlations rather than deterministic causality. As has been 
emphasised, it is thus a matter of management and not the resources per se that influences the 
outcomes of a resource led development. This deduction is highly applicable to other regions and 
countries in the world, as it is not bound specifically to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The 
argument is thus, that the scope of investigation should be the specific characteristics of countries 
management of the resources, rather than the mere fact that these countries possess abundant 
natural resources. 
Second, we have created a thorough understanding of economic development in a post-Soviet 
reality, with all the corresponding characteristics this entail. Opposite to the theoretical findings 
this is closely related to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which obviously restrain these 
conclusions from being directly applied to other Central Asian or East European states. On the 
other hand, remaining Central Asian and Eastern European states have correspondingly, like 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, until 1991 been an integrated part of the Soviet production system 
and -economy and they have also undergone similar political, social and demographic reforms cf. 
chapter 4.2 Soviet legacy. This means that the insight into these legacy dynamics may be useful 
when trying to understand the development of former Soviet countries with abundant resources. 
However, while acknowledging that other Central Asian and Eastern European states might have 
experienced comparable economic and socioeconomic challenges in the years following 
independence, this would require further investigation to answer comprehensively. 
Lastly, the changing geopolitical dynamics of Central Asia and the changing global political 
economy dynamics of terms of trade are also to a large extent possible to apply outside the 
context of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Logically, the changing geopolitical dynamics of 
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Central Asia are also relevant if one were to analyse Uzbekistan, Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan due to 
the proximity to the same countries as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The one reservation being 
that several of the present report's geopolitical conclusions are closely related to the unique 
characteristics of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan cf. the proximity of Russia and China in the case 
of Kazakhstan and the inherent challenges in Turkmenistan’s gas deposits, the out-dated pipeline 
system and the proximity of Iran. The geopolitical conclusions should therefore be understood in 
that perspective and used with caution in the context of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan. 
When it comes to the changing terms of trade and its influence on countries pursuing a 
resource-led development strategy this has indisputable relevance for other countries and regions 
than Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and Central Asia, respectively. Chinese demand is of such a 
scale that it is not confined to neighbouring countries. South American and African countries are 
also influenced by the rise of China (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011), which underlines the possibility of 
generalising that particular finding in the present report. 
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